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Abstract 
It is typically said that there are two questions that political philosophy seeks to address: ‘who gets 
what?’ and ‘who decides on who gets what?’ South Africa, along with much of the rest of the world, 
has answered the second question badly and currently ranks as one of the world’s most unequal 
societies. Counter-intuitively, South Africa maintains a social-political order that (re)produces this 
inequality along with great enthusiasm for ubuntu, an African ethic that at a minimum requires that 
we treat each other humanely. However, due to the view that ubuntu has been co-opted in support 
of South Africa’s unjust system, ubuntu has largely been ignored by radical thinkers. The aim of this 
thesis is therefore to explore the possibility of an ubuntu-based political philosophy, with the core 
assumption that political philosophy is rooted in ethical theory. Three tasks are therefore 
undertaken in this thesis. Firstly, ubuntu is articulated as an ethic. Secondly, it is compared to similar 
Western ethical theories in order to determine if there are distinguishing characteristics that make 
ubuntu a more appropriate founding ethic for South African political philosophy. Finally, whether 
ubuntu can find real-world applicability will be assessed by looking at the way ubuntu has been used 
in the law.   
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Introduction 
 
It is typically said that there are two questions that political philosophy seeks to address: ‘who gets 
what?’ and ‘who decides on who gets what?’(Wolff, 1996, p. 1). In South Africa, it may appear that 
both questions have been resolved. General elections are held every five years to determine who 
rules (Section 86, Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996) and distributive questions are 
resolved by the market, with state intervention to redistribute some national wealth occurring via a 
few main budgetary mechanisms; including a progressive tax system, spending on public education, 
health care, and welfare payments (Nattress & Seekings, 2001, p. 493).  
 
However, the answer to the question of ‘who gets what’ remains unsatisfactory. On the 
international level, there is renewed interest in finding alternative ways to arrange the socio-
economic order, both due to the recent financial crisis, and because of the dire environmental 
consequences associated with market capitalism (Fluxman, 2009, p. 377). Douzinas and Žižek argue 
that the collapse of the banking system in 2008 called into question not only economic 
understandings of capitalism, but that it ‘has matured into a full-fledged political crisis which is de-
legitimizing political systems’ and has ‘renewed interest in radical ideas and politics’(2010, pp. vii-
viii). In Western political thought, this trend has largely taken the form of a renewed interest in 
Marxism, which is clearly reflected in the recent outpouring of Marxist literature. Literature in this 
vein includes Douzinas and Žižek’s The Idea of Communism (2010) (following the 2009 conference on 
the same topic held at the Birkbeck Institute for the Humanities) and Terry Eagleton’s Why Marx 
Was Right (2011). Most recently, The Guardian announced that, ‘Yes, Karl Marx is going mainstream 
– and goodness knows where it will end’ (Jeffries, 4 July 2012). 
 
 On the local level, the current South African system requires attention, due to the gross inequality 
that it produces. In the 2009 Human Development Report, South Africa’s Gini Index rating was listed 
as 57.8, based on data from the 1992-2007 period.1 Further, in the 2002-2007 period, 42.9% of 
South Africans lived on $2 or less a day; while 44.9% of all expenditure came from just 10% of the 
population (United Nations Development Programme, 2009). 
 
 However, contrary to the Western trend toward Marx, South Africa has experienced a ‘retreat’ from 
Marxism in the post-apartheid era (Helliker & Vale, 2012, p. 1). Helliker and Vale argue that the 
                                                          
1
 The Gini Index operates on a scale of 0-100, where 0 represents perfect equality and 100 represents perfect 
inequality.  
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decreased interest in Marx may have the positive effect of curbing radical thinkers’ fixation with the 
state, thus creating the space for a more society-orientated political philosophy to develop (Helliker 
& Vale, 2012, pp. 2, 11). Such a shift would involve recognizing ‘the legitimacy, viability and 
significance of sites outside the state that involve popular-radical struggles challenging the basis and 
form of state power’(Helliker & Vale, 2012, p. 11). However, they also argue that dismissing the state 
entirely would be unsatisfactory because ‘[i]f transformation is to be authentic, both state-centred 
and society-centred forms of change are needed’ (Helliker & Vale, 2012, p. 9). 
 
Ubuntu seems to offer an ethic that may plausibly form the basis of a political philosophy that is 
both state and society orientated, given the political role it has played in post-apartheid South Africa 
and its overall resonance within peoples’ lived experiences. However, as McDonald notes, radical 
thinkers have largely ignored ubuntu (McDonald, 2010, p. 140). This thesis explores the possibility of 
an ubuntu-based political philosophy.  
 
Towards this end, the study will be divided into three chapters. The first chapter will focus on 
articulating ubuntu as an ethic. The second chapter will focus on comparing it to similar ethical 
theories in order to determine if there are distinguishing characteristics that make ubuntu more 
appropriate than other communally-orientated moral theories for forming the basis of a South 
African political philosophy. The third chapter will assess whether ubuntu can realistically find 
practical application by looking at how ubuntu has gained legal applicability.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 
 
Chapter 1: 
Ubuntu as a Moral Theory 
 
Political philosophy is rooted in moral philosophy, where prescriptions of right action for the 
individual are amplified to prescriptions of right action for state and in standard political philosophy 
the ethical base is typically provided by Kantianism or Utilitarianism(Metz, 2009, p. 335). This 
chapter aims to describe and defend a theory of right action implicit in ubuntu, with the intention 
that this can be used as the premise for an African political philosophy – the task of subsequent 
chapters. In describing an ubuntu ethic, the aim is not to uncover the ‘most true’ account of ubuntu. 
As van Binsbergen argues: 
[T]he majority of the population of Southern Africa today cannot be properly 
said to know and to live ubuntu by any continuity with village life. They have to 
be educated to pursue (under the name of ubuntu) a global and urban 
reformulation of village values. And they learn this on the authority, not of 
traditional diviner-priests… but of recognised opinion leaders of the globalised 
centre: politicians, university intellectuals(Van Bisburgen, 2001, p. 64).  
 
The sources of ubuntu morality in contemporary South Africa are not necessarily Oruka’s sages.2 The 
experience of colonialism and oppression has damaged the connection to pre-colonial life(Praeg, 
2000, p. 97); and therefore, trying to find the most ‘authentic’ (that is to say, the most accurate 
reflection of pre-colonial values) description of ubuntu would be impossible. Instead, ubuntu needs 
to be thought of in terms of Eric Hobsbawm’s notion of ‘invented tradition’, which refers to the idea 
that ‘[t]raditions which appear or claim to be old are often quite recent in origin and sometimes 
invented’(1992, p. 1).For example, Trevor-Roper argues that the culture of the Scottish Highlands – 
kilts, bagpipes, etc. – only came into existence during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries as a 
form of resistance against union with England, despite being represented as a cultural practice 
dating back to time immemorial (1992, pp. 15-16).  But as Praeg cautions, ‘to reinvent tradition does 
not mean we simply make it up’(2008, p. 373). This warning is especially pertinent in the case of 
ubuntu, because unlike the invention of the Scottish Highland Games, ubuntu practice persists as a 
deep-rooted part of many South Africans’ lived experience. For instance, in Shutte’s description of 
German and African nuns living in the same convent, he argues that the African nuns see it as 
imperative to spend their free time in conversation with one another in order to strengthen their 
relationships, while the German nuns living in the same convent do not see conversation or 
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 See Oruka’s Sage Philosophy: Indigenous Thinkers and Modern Debate on African Philosophy(1990). 
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relationship-building as a moral imperative (Shutte, 2001, pp. 27-28)3. Further, the process of the 
South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission provides a number of examples of people who 
prioritised ubuntu by means of the show of forgiveness. One particularly moving example is Cynthia 
Ngewu’s forgiveness of her son’s apartheid murderer when she says: 
This thing called reconciliation … if I am understanding it correctly … if it means 
this perpetrator, this man who has killed Christopher Piet, if it means he becomes 
human again, this man, so that I, so that all of us, get our humanity back … then I 
agree, then I support it all (quote taken from Praeg 2008, pp. 374-375).  
 
Given the significant role that ubuntu continues to play in social exchange, it cannot be casually 
defined. The description of ubuntu as an ethic that is provided in this thesis will have to take account 
of two things: the reality that the current discourse of ubuntu is unlikely to be properly ‘authentic’; 
and Praeg’s warning that we cannot simply invent ubuntu anew. The approach here will therefore be 
to go through various accounts of ubuntu as a moral theory that have gained credence in the 
literature and to select from these accounts that definition of ubuntu as an ethic best suited for 
developing ubuntu as a political theory.  
 
Setting out an ubuntu moral theory 
 
The word ‘ubuntu’ comes from the Nguni language family, i.e. Zulu, Xhosa, Swati, and Ndebele; and 
it means something close to ‘human’ or ‘humaneness’(Metz, 2007, p. 322). Equivalent terms are 
found in other African languages, such as botho in the Sotho languages, vhutu in Venda, bunhu in 
Tsonga and hunhu in Shona (Louw, 2001, p. 29; Midgley & Keep, 2007, p. 31; Van Bisburgen, 2001, p. 
53).  According to Van Binsburgen the term ‘ubuntu’ is composed of the suffix ntu which refers to 
that which is human4, and the prefix ubu, which is a construction that allows for the creation of 
abstract concepts (Van Bisburgen, 2001, p. 54). When the prefix and the suffix are joined they form a 
term that refers to an abstract concept related to humanness.  
 
Defining ubuntu beyond ‘humaneness’ and providing an ethical structure based on ubuntu has been 
a difficult task for many authors.  There are at least three ways in which the question of how to 
derive clear ethical content from ubuntu has been approached. These include: ‘an ubuntu ethic by 
religion’ – accounts of ubuntu as an ethical theory that incorporate religious (typically Christian) 
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 This is likely to be an over-simplification of the nuns’ moral perspectives, but it nonetheless serves the point 
that there are still people who live ‘by ubuntu’.  
4
 Comparable terms include muntu (a human) and bantu (people) (Van Bisburgen, 2001, p. 54).  
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elements into their descriptions(Battle, 1997; Shutte, 1993; Shutte, 2001; Tutu, 2000); ‘an ubuntu 
ethic by maxim’ – accounts of ubuntu that take short proverbs or sayings as the basis for the 
definition of ubuntu that can be expanded to the level of ethical theory (Mokgoro, 1998); and ‘an 
ubuntu ethic by underlying principle’ – accounts of ubuntu that aggregate many African moral 
beliefs, with the intention of locating a single ethic that may serve to capture the moral content of a 
variety of beliefs (Metz, 2007).  
 
Other taxonomies for thinking about ubuntu have been proffered. For instance, Metz provides six 
potential descriptions of ubuntu as an ethic in Toward an African Moral Theory (2007), however 
these are descriptions of the possible content of an appropriate ubuntu ethic5, not competing 
descriptions of how that content might be derived – Metz is fairly convinced that the best way of 
locating ubuntu as a moral theory is to discover the ethic that captures the greatest number of other 
moral beliefs that people already hold. Hailey, in a commissioned report on ubuntu for the Tutu 
Foundation, makes a concerted attempt to systematise the various approaches to thinking about 
ubuntu. He describes ubuntu thought as falling into the following categories: theological ubuntu 
(such as the description of ubuntu promoted by Tutu)(2008, pp. 5-6),practically-orientated ubuntu 
(such as ubuntu-based management theory)(2008, p. 7), ubuntu via proverbs (such as umuntu 
ngumuntu ngabantu or ‘a person is a person through other persons’) or greetings (such as sawabana 
or muse atse which mean ‘I see you’)(2008, p. 8), and ubuntu as reconciliation (that is the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission and President Mandela’s nation building)(2008, pp. 13-14). While this is a 
useful taxonomy for thinking about the key trends in the ubuntu literature, not all of Hailey’s 
categories are ethical in nature, and so it is necessary to have a more narrow set of categories for 
describing ubuntu as a moral theory.  
 
The categorization of approaches to ubuntu presented in this thesis (an ubuntu ethic by religion, an 
ubuntu ethic by maxim, and an ubuntu ethic by underlying principle) relates most directly to a 
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 These are: 1) ‘An action is right just insofar as it respects a person’s dignity; an act is wrong to the extent that 
it degrades humanity’ (p.328); 2) ‘An action is right just insofar as it promotes the well-being of others, an act 
is wrong to the extent that it fails to enhance the welfare of one’s fellows’ (p.330); 3) ‘An action is right just 
insofar as it promotes the well-being of others without violating their rights; an act is wrong to the extent that 
it either violates rights or fails to enhance the welfare of one’s fellows without violating rights’ (p. 330); 4) ‘An 
action is right just insofar as it positively relates to others and thereby realizes oneself; an act is wrong to the 
extent that it does not perfect one’s valuable nature as a social being’(p. 331); 5) ‘An action is right just insofar 
as it is in solidarity with groups whose survival is threatened; an act is wrong to the extent that it fails to 
support a vulnerable community’(p. 333); 6) ‘An action is right just insofar as it produces harmony and reduces 
discord; an act is wrong to the extent that it fails to develop community’(p. 334).  
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currently unpublished seminar presentation by Jason Van Niekerk in the Rhodes University 
Philosophy Department in 2010.  While there is some overlap with Hailey’s categories, this approach 
is favoured because it allows for the focus to be on ubuntu as an ethical theory, not on broader 
descriptions of ubuntu. Each category of ubuntu as an ethical theory will now be discussed.  
 
An ubuntu ethic by religion6 
 
One of the most prominent articulations of ubuntu as an ethic was provided by Desmond Tutu in his 
sermons during the end of apartheid.7 Since then, there have been three writers who have 
articulated religious-based accounts of an ubuntu ethic. These include Desmond Tutu himself in No 
Future without Forgiveness (1999), Michael Battle in Reconciliation: the Ubuntu theology of 
Desmond Tutu (1997) (in which he systematises Tutu’s thought into something more recognizably 
philosophical) and Augustine Shutte, in Ubuntu (2001) and Philosophy for Africa (1993).  
 
In No Future without Forgiveness, Tutu provides what appears to be a secular description of ubuntu. 
He states:  
When we want to give high praise to someone we say,“ Yu, u nobuntu”; “Hey, 
so-and-so has ubuntu.” Then you are generous, you are hospitable you are 
friendly and caring and compassionate. You share what you have. It is to say, 
“My humanity is caught up, is inextricably bound up, in yours.”  We belong in a 
bundle of life. We say, “A person is a person through other persons.” It is not, “I 
think therefore I am.” It says rather: “I am human because I belong. I participate, 
I share.” A person with ubuntu is open and available to others, affirming of 
others, does not feel threatened that others are able and good, for he or she has 
a proper self-assurance that comes from knowing that he or she belongs in a 
greater whole and is diminished when others are humiliated or diminished, 
when others are tortured or oppressed, or treated as if they were less than who 
they are. Harmony, friendliness, community are great goods. Social harmony is 
for us the summum bonum - the greatest good. Anything that subverts, that 
undermines this sought-after good, is to be avoided like the plague. Anger, 
resentment, lust for revenge, even success through aggressive competitiveness, 
are corrosive of this good. To forgive is not just to be altruistic. It is the best 
form of self-interest. What dehumanizes you inexorably dehumanizes me. It 
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This refers specifically to what Hailey terms ‘theological ubuntu’ (2008, p. 5), that is - ubuntu connected to the 
Judeo-Christian religious tradition, such as the descriptions of ubuntu made popular by Desmond Tutu. It does 
not refer to the metaphysically-laden accounts of ubuntu that involve the ancestors, although these will also 
be discussed later in this dissertation.   
7
 It is unlikely that Tutu provided the first articulation of ubuntu as an ethic, and it is interesting to note that in 
Gade’s historical account of ubuntu’s conceptual development, the description of ubuntu as an ‘ethic’ only 
became popular in the 1980s; whereas written accounts of ubuntu date back to 1846(Gade, 2011, p. 309) .  
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gives people resilience, enabling them to survive and emerge still human despite 
all efforts to dehumanize them (Tutu, 2000, p. 31).  
 
Although this description of ubuntu appears secular8, the context in which Tutu places this 
description is explicitly within the Christian tradition. For instance, following shortly after the above 
passage, in his discussion on the antecedent conditions for peaceful transition in South Africa, he 
references St Paul’s letter to the Galatians, where Paul tells the story of the historical circumstances 
that were necessary for the birth of Christ. Tutu compares this to the fortuitous culmination of 
events that allowed for South Africa’s peaceful transition to democracy (Tutu, 2000, p. 36). The 
Christian-religious elements of Tutu’s ethic are all the more prominent in Michael Battle’s 
articulation of Tutu’s thought.  
 
Battle assembles Tutu’s sermons, writings and general comments into what he describes as an 
‘ubuntu theology’ (Battle, 1997, p. 4) – a name indicative of the Christianised approach. The 
conceptual point of departure for ubuntu theology is the biblical creation story of Adam and Eve in 
the Garden of Eden, particularly the moment in which Adam recognised his loneliness, and Eve was 
created to provide him with companionship (Battle, 1997, p. 4&42). The result of this account is that 
humans were literally ‘made’ to live together and to form relationships (Battle, 1997, p. 41). The 
implication of this, both for ethics and for determining the good life, is that human potential can 
only be fully realised in relationship with others and in relationship with god, in whose image 
humans are created.  
 
The problem with Tutu and Battle’s articulation of an ubuntu ethic is that it is exclusive to those who 
accept the religious account. If a viable post-colonial African political philosophy is to be developed, 
one that takes as its point of reference to be a political community represented by the nation or the 
state, it is  clear that its founding ethic needs to be secular in order to avoid being exclusionary. This 
non-secular approach to ubuntu as an ethic is thus set aside here. 
 
Shutte is sensitive to this criticism and recognises the need for an inclusive ubuntu ethic (Shutte, 
2001, p. 14). His aim is to create a founding ethic for post-apartheid South Africa that can be applied 
to a wide variety of political issues, including: gender, family, education, and labour policy. From his 
perspective, he ensures that his founding ethic is sufficiently diverse, by merging the Western value 
of freedom with the African value of community (Shutte, 2001, p. 10). However, Shutte sees religion 
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as basic to all human life, and therefore necessary for a full description of an ethical system (Shutte, 
2001, p. 198; Shutte, 1993, p. 12). In order to justify the religious elements of his ubuntu account, he 
puts forward the following argument. 
 
Firstly, Shutte takes it to be fundamental to ubuntu that one’s personal growth is connected to the 
community more broadly. However, he argues that this capacity to promote growth has to have a 
source. It cannot come from the community itself, because eventually this leads to a problem of an 
infinite regress – with the question arising of who it is that empowers the community to empower 
the individual to achieve personal growth – and so there must be some higher source of power, 
which Shutte concludes is god (Shutte, 2001, p. 201). Whether this argument is successful will be 
bracketed for our purposes. Shutte does not see this as compromising the inclusivity of his project, 
because he leaves the question of which religion to follow open. Further, he argues that all religions 
(as manifestations of the universal phenomenon of religion) would be compatible with ubuntu, 
because they all need to comply with elements of human nature, including the human tendency to 
be social (Shutte, 2001, p. 200). However, instead of making Shutte’s ubuntu ethic more inclusive, 
this description is likely to make it doubly exclusive. Not only does his account exclude non-religious 
members of society, in the same way as Tutu and Battle, because they are unlikely to accept the 
creationist elements of his account, but he is also likely to isolate religious members of society, who 
are unlikely to accept that their religion complies with ubuntu, especially given the emphasis that 
Shutte places on serti (the force field that connects all people and animates all being) and on the 
role of ancestors in his account. He therefore ultimately falls prey to the same problems as Tutu and 
Battle.  
 
None of the religious accounts of ubuntu ultimately provide us with an adequate ethic for the 
purposes of constructing a socially functional ubuntu-based political philosophy, because each is 
only likely to be accepted by isolated segments of society and are therefore poor candidates for a 
broad political philosophy. 
 
An ubuntu ethic by maxims 
 
It was noted above that ubuntu is often translated to mean ‘humaneness’. Another popular way of 
providing definitional content for ubuntu is by making use of maxims. Perhaps the best known of 
these maxims is umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu or ‘a person is a person through other persons’(Shutte, 
1993, p. 46). Another maxim is Mbiti’s statement ‘I am because we are, and since we are, therefore I 
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am’ (Mbiti, 1969, p. 106). This way of providing definitional content has become quite popular, and 
was even included in Mokgoro J’s definition of ubuntu in S v Makwanyana9, where she defines 
ubuntu thus: ‘Generally, ubuntu translates as humaneness. In its most fundamental sense, it 
translates as personhood and morality. Metaphorically, it expresses itself in umuntu ngumuntu 
ngabantu …’(paragraph 308). 
 
 In Gade’s description of ubuntu’s historical development, he argues that the maxims are a 
comparatively new addition to the ubuntu discussion, only coming to prominence in the 1993-1995 
period. He hypothesises that the emergence of ubuntu via these maxims is linked to the publication 
of Shutte’s Philosophy for Africa in 1993, which he believes is the first English publication to explore 
the moral beliefs embedded in the maxims (Gade, 2011, p. 313).10 Further, Gade goes on to 
speculate that the emergence of the maxims in this period is linked to the concurrent political 
transition. His reasoning is that it was politically useful for this conception of ubuntu to emerge, 
because apartheid was characterised by division and it was necessary for the new leadership that 
South Africans cooperate in order for the transition to be successful. Ubuntu as an ethic promoted 
this kind of cooperation and linking it to traditional proverbs and maxims in an indigenous language 
allowed for these ideas to have greater legitimacy among the oppressed black majority ‘who 
considered ubuntu to be something good and deeply rooted in their culture’(Gade, 2011, p. 321). He 
also notes that some have speculated that the introduction of the proverbs allowed for complex 
philosophical content of ubuntu to be expressed more succinctly than it had been previously, which 
was seen as an important discursive shift for ubuntu to be able to form the basis of political 
transition – i.e. the conversion of a complex system of thought into an ‘intellectual bumper sticker of 
sorts’ was politically expedient (Gade, 2011, p. 320). However, as Gade notes, it is almost impossible 
to substantiate accounts of how the maxims came to be popular descriptors of ubuntu. It is possible 
that post-apartheid leaders had no such motivations and that the shift to ubuntu via the maxims 
may have occurred more organically (Gade, 2011, p. 321).  
 
It seems clear that these maxims are not simply drawn upon to make descriptive claims about 
ubuntu, rather they are used in order to have some kind of normative force. For instance, Mokgoro J 
uses her definition of ubuntu to advocate for death penalty repeal in S v Makwanyane. Gade 
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meanwhile notes that some writers go so far as to interpret the maxim as identical to an ethical 
claim, not just something from which ethical content can be derived (Gade, 2011, p. 321).  But one 
might ask precisely where the normative force of the maxims is located. One possibility is that they 
are implied ontological statements, and that the normative force of the ethical claim is rooted in 
their ontology. This is the manner in which Placide Temples, the notorious ethno-philosopher, 
understood African ethical structures. He describes the relationship between ontology and ethics as 
follows: 
Objective morality to the Bantu is ontological, immanent and intrinsic morality. 
Bantu moral standards depend essentially on things ontologically understood. 
Knowledge of a necessary natural order of forces forms part of the wisdom of 
primitive peoples. From that we may conclude that an act of usage will be 
characterized as ontologically good by Bantu and that it will therefore be 
accounted ethically good; and at length, by deduction, be assessed as juridically 
just (Temples, 1969, p. 121). 
 
One writer who has pursued these ontological implications is Menkiti. He argues that one can only 
acquire personhood through a process of increasing incorporation into the community. This is what 
he refers to as a ‘processual’ account of personhood, and it relies on a process of ontological 
progression throughout the course of a person’s life (Menkiti, 1984, pp. 172-173). If this is read 
against these maxims, then it can be seen that one is, quite literally, only a person through other 
persons. As a result of this ontology, there are also limitations to personhood. Failure to participate 
or to participate successfully in processual becoming can leave one as a ‘non-person’, or ‘non-
human’. Of course, Menkiti’s reading is contested, especially by Gyeke, who argues that Menkiti’s 
emphasis on the priority of the community is ‘overstated’ and that he misinterprets the examples 
from Akan culture that are used to support his argument(Gyeke, 2002, pp. 299, 301-305). Gyeke’s 
objections notwithstanding, the full implication of Mentiki’s ontological approach to ethics is 
pursued here. Gyeke’s critique will then be revisited.   
 
Menkiti recognises that there is a relationship between the ethical and the ontological, but he 
structures his account such that the ethical informs the ontological. For instance, he argues that the 
young are not yet moral and that this contributes to the community perspective that they have not 
yet acquired personhood (Menkiti, 1984, p. 175). However, it seems likely that the ontological 
relationship works in the reverse to what is suggested by Menkiti here, namely that one’s ethics is 
premised upon an understanding of the ontological (as suggested by Temples in the above quote). 
For instance, if one accepts an extremely individualistic ontology, then it is more likely that intense 
competitiveness would be morally permissible and inform one’s morality. However, if one accepts 
11 
 
an ontology of interdependence, then it is likely that the ethical account flowing from that would be 
more focused on reciprocal obligations between self and community. According to Menkiti’s 
account, where an individual is not even a person until the community recognises them as such, it 
seems more likely that one would necessarily have intense ethical duties to that community. 
However, he does not explore what these obligations might be and it is outside the scope of this 
chapter to do so.  
 
The problem with this approach is that the ontological claim relied upon to generate the ethical 
account is firstly of a deep metaphysical interconnectedness, and secondly one that derives its depth 
from supernatural elements. For instance, on Menkiti’s account he includes the ancestors as part of 
the community that constitutes the moral rightness of certain actions (Menkiti, 1984, p. 175). This 
reliance on the supernatural is problematic for an ethics that is meant to form the basis of a political 
theory relevant to an imagined community of diverse people and cultures, much like the problem 
faced by the religious accounts of ubuntu. The question that arises is thus whether we would still 
arrive at this situation if Gyeke’s critique taken into account. It is worth asking whether this is a real 
problem, or just one that has manifested as a result of factual inaccuracies.  
 
It seems unlikely that following Gyeke would be significantly more satisfactory. To assess this 
further, it is necessary to work through the stages of his reasoning.  
 
Gyeke is also sympathetic to the idea that we need an ontological account (what he refers to as the 
‘metaphysical’) in order to understand morality (Gyeke, 2002, p. 297) and he also uses the proverbs 
and maxims of a ‘traditional’ Africa to derive his ontological content. For instance, in assessing the 
relationship between the individual and the community, he refers to the Akan maxim ‘duo baako 
nnye kwae’ or ‘one tree does not make or constitute a forest’(Gyeke, 2002, p. 300) – i.e. he takes the 
maxim as having ontological import, which once understood, has ethical implications. Therefore, 
Gyeke follows the same theoretical structure as Menkiti. But this is not in itself problematic. Initially 
his approach seems much more promising, because he offers a more moderate communitarianism 
than Mentiki, in which he argues that aspects of the individual beyond her communal orientation 
need to be taken into account (Gyeke, 2002, p. 301). However, in the end, he still turns to the 
supernatural to ‘ground’ his theory. For instance, when discussing the importance of ‘dignity’ in 
African thought, he draws on the maxim ‘nnipa nyinaa ye Onyame mma; obiara nnye asase ba’, 
which can be translated as ‘all persons are children of God; no one is a child of the earth’ (Gyeke, 
2002, p. 307). He takes this to mean that because each person is a child of god, and because god is 
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good, each person has intrinsic value and is therefore worthy of dignity (Gyeke, 2002, p. 307). 
Appealing to Kant, he goes on to argue that there is a secular route to reaching this conclusion, and 
he thereby strays from African thought (Gyeke, 2002, p. 307). This leaves Gyeke in a dilemma. Either 
he sustains a particular African communitarianism that is exclusivist because of its metaphysical 
elements, or he secularises it (with reference to Kant), which makes it more inclusive - but less 
African. Neither of these results are likely to be satisfactory for Gyeke.  
 
In yet another example of using the maxims to derive ethical content, Drucilla Cornell – who will be 
discussed more extensively in the third chapter – also relies on an account of ubuntu that includes 
ancestors, and from that ontological premise develops various normative requirements. Let us begin 
by looking at the maxims she uses to derive an African ontology. She states that: 
 
The famous phrase umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu literally means ‘a person is a 
person by or through other people’ … There are innumerable phrases and 
parables that are used in Xhosa and Zulu to teach us about uBuntu, this is only 
one. Still, since it is so well known, we can begin with it in our examination of 
uBuntu (Cornell, 2009 , p. 47).  
 
Further:  
There is a famous isiXhosa saying ‘what goes out the front door comes in the 
back window’. The idea here is that we live in a force field in which ethical 
actions reverberate and encourage affirmative ethical environments (Cornell, 
2009 , p. 48 ).  
 
The latter quote captures perfectly this approach of deriving ethical content from the maxims. There 
is a maxim, it provides ontological content – in this case that there is a ‘force field in which ethical 
actions reverberate’ – and this leads to the conclusion that we should behave in certain ethical ways 
– treat others well so that only good things come back to us. Additionally, Cornell’s ontology relies 
on supernatural elements, in the context of this quote a ‘force field’, but more generally in her 
approach she relies on ancestors as forming an important part of her ontological framework 
(Cornell, 2009 , pp. 46-47).  
 
The tendency toward accounts of inter-connectedness that are metaphysically grounded in 
ancestors and supernaturalism, such as can be found in the approaches of Menkiti, Geyeke and 
Cornell, is extremely problematic for the present purpose. We therefore need to reject the approach 
of developing an ubuntu ethic that is reached via ontologically grounded maxims. It is tempting to 
suggest that we should just bracket or suspend the metaphysical and supernatural elements of this 
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approach, thus leaving a purely secular account behind. However, the problem with suspending the 
non-secular aspects of these accounts is that the maxims lose their normative force when separated 
from their metaphysical premises. This is a similar point to that made by MacIntyre in After Virtue 
(1985), where he argues that the abandonment of the teleological premises of ethical theory during 
the Enlightenment resulted in a set of empty (and somewhat arbitrary) moral prescriptions. 
Bracketing the supernatural elements here leaves us with a similarly arbitrary moral framework, in 
that there is nothing left to appeal to when individuals choose not to be moral. For instance, in the 
pre-Enlightenment moral world to which MacIntyre refers, instances of moral disagreement or 
moral disregard could be resolved by appealing to god, the ultimate adjudicator. With god falling  
out of the ethical picture, there was no one to appeal to in order to enforce the moral code, and 
philosophers in the Western tradition have been grappling with the question of ‘why be moral’ ever 
since. Similarly, advocates of the metaphysically-laden accounts of ubuntu are able to appeal to the 
ancestors as the enforcers and advocates of the moral law. If the ancestors are removed from these 
ethical accounts, then the proponents of such accounts are left in the same quandary as the post-
Enlightenment moral philosophers in the West, that is - without any response to those who would 
act counter to the prescriptions of ubuntu, except  perhaps something to the effect of ‘it is nice to be 
nice’.  
 
An ubuntu ethic by underlying principle 
  
Metz’s methodology begins by providing a descriptive account of what moral beliefs people actually 
hold and then articulating a unifying moral theory that underpins those beliefs thereafter. This 
specific approach is articulated by Metz in the paper Toward an African Moral Theory (2007), where 
he lists specific acts that would be considered immoral in African communities and then to tries 
establish the common principle that serves to explain the immorality of those acts. As with the 
previous approach, the process here is deductive. But while the previous approach deducts ethics 
from ontology (or vice versa), Metz suggests deducting ethics from a variety of acts already 
considered immoral. His intention is that the common principle would then represent the 
fundamental ethical principle adhered to by African communities. His list of immoral acts follows, in 
which the first six are acts considered to be immoral in both Western and African communities, 
while the second six are those that are likely to be considered immoral only in African communities. 
In African and Western communities it would be immoral: 
A. to kill innocent people for money; 
B. to have sex with someone without her [or his] consent; 
C. to deceive people, at least when not done in self- or other-defence; 
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D. to steal (that is, to take from their rightful owner) unnecessary goods; 
E. to violate trust, for example, break a promise, for marginal personal gain; 
F. to discriminate on a racial basis when allocating opportunities (Metz, 2007). 
 
In pre-Colonial African societies, and potentially in some contemporary African societies, it would be 
considered immoral:  
G. to make policy decisions in the face of dissent, as opposed to seeking 
consensus; 
H. to make retribution a fundamental and central aim of criminal justice, as 
opposed to seeking reconciliation; 
I. to create wealth largely on a competitive basis, as opposed to a cooperative 
one; 
J. to distribute wealth largely on the basis of individual rights, as opposed to need; 
K. to ignore others and violate communal norms, as opposed to acknowledging 
others, upholding tradition and partaking in rituals; 
L. to fail to marry and procreate, as opposed to creating a family (Metz, 2007, pp. 
324-327). 
 
Before looking at the principle Metz proposes to unify these beliefs, two questions need to be 
addressed. Firstly, which ‘Africans’ are these beliefs meant to represent? Secondly, where does he 
source these ‘African beliefs’ (G-L)? In response to the first question, Metz does not intend for this to 
be a theory that is representative of all individuals living in or originating from Sub-Saharan Africa, 
and he explicitly wishes to avoid the essentialising and homogenising effects that claims to this 
broad kind of representation result in. Instead he intends for these to be taken as ‘tendencies’- i.e. 
beliefs that can be found broadly amongst people of specifically Sub-Saharan Africa (Metz, 2007b, p. 
333). Specific groups that Metz has in mind are: ‘the Zulu in South Africa to the Shona in Zimbabwe, 
the Gwi in Botswana, the Behema in the Congo, the Nso’ in Cameroon, the Yoruba and the Tiv in 
Nigeria, and the Ashanti and Akan in Ghana’(Metz, 2007b, p. 333). Where does his account of these 
beliefs come from? Metz explicitly answers this question in The Motivation for “Toward an African 
Moral Theory” (2007b). He states that his list was: 
Obtained as a result of reading several dozen anthropological and philosophical 
works about the moral beliefs of Africans, participating in conferences and 
colloquia with those who live on the African continent, receiving written input 
from academic colleagues familiar with African ethics, engaging with students in 
my ethics classes in South Africa, and, finally, speaking to my colleagues on the 
recently inaugurated Ubuntu Advisory Panel of the South African National 
Heritage Council (Metz, 2007b, p. 333). 
 
A brief glance over the literature provides supporting examples for G-L. The belief that it would be 
improper to make policy decisions in the face of dissent instead of seeking consensus (G) is 
supported by Wiredu in Democracy and consensus in African traditional politics: A plea for a non-
party polity (1998) and by Busia’s Africa in Search of Democracy(1967, p. 28). The belief that it would 
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be improper for criminal justice to seek only retribution and to avoid reconciliation (H) is supported 
by Mokgoro in Ubuntu and the law in South Africa (1998). The belief that is improper to engage in 
competitive (as opposed to cooperative) activities in the pursuit of wealth (I) is supported by Tutu in 
No Future Without Forgiveness (2000, p. 31). The belief that it would be improper to distribute 
wealth purely on the basis of individual rights and ignoring needs (J) is supported by Ramose in 
African Philosophy through Ubuntu (1999, p. 194).  
 
He proposes that the principle that unifies these acts is: ‘An action is right just insofar as it produces 
harmony and reduces discord; an act is wrong to the extent that it fails to develop community’ 
(Metz, 2007, p. 334). The necessary conditions that need to be in place in order for this principle to 
exist are i) that individuals must have a shared sense of identity and ii) they must have good will 
towards each other. This sense of good will might even be described as ‘love’, which would make 
sense of the oft-cited analogy between African communities and extended families, where a healthy 
family is one in which its members have a shared sense of identity and love for each other(Metz, 
2007, p. 337). The analogy of family is also used by Shutte thus: 
Perhaps the best model for human community as understood in African thought it 
the family. The family has no function outside itself. It is a means of growth for its 
members, and the interaction, the companionship and conversation, is also an 
end in itself (Shutte, 1993, p. 50). 
 
Metz therefore provides a secular, ubuntu-based normative ethical theory, grounded in peoples’ 
relationships with each other (Metz, 2007, p. 333). He claims that it is the relational quality of his 
ethical account that makes it African (Metz, 2007, p. 333), while noting that Western communitarian 
philosophies are also premised on locating the moral good in the relationships between people, and 
not in any one particular person. This suggests that Metz’s theory is vulnerable to criticism. Ramose 
criticises Metz on precisely this issue (Ramose M. , 2007, pp. 353-354). Metz responds by arguing 
that it is ‘African’ because it is premised on beliefs held by Africans, and that is ‘distinctive’ in that 
these beliefs are more prevalent in Africa than in the West (Metz, 2007a, p. 375). Further, he is 
happy to accept that this may not be an ethical system that is ‘unique’ to Africa and that it may still 
be a characteristically African theory without being unique (Metz, 2007a, p. 376). These are 
appropriate responses to Ramose’s criticism, but the concern is left open that if there is nothing at 
all that conceptually distinguishes ubuntu from similar concepts in Western thought, then the 
project may not be worth pursuing, because one can get the same conceptual results from already 
well worked out moral theories with substantially less effort. More time therefore needs to spent 
assessing whether ubuntu is distinctive.  The next chapter will therefore provide an account of 
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communitarianism, humanism and feminist communitarianism in order to compare them with 
Metz’s theory.  
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Chapter 2: 
Comparing Ubuntu: Communitarians, Humanists and Feminist 
Communitarians 
 
The first chapter concluded that Metz’s theory of an ubuntu ethic provides an appropriate moral 
theory on which to premise an ubuntu political philosophy. This chapter aims to assess whether 
there is anything distinguishable about this account of ubuntu when compared to other collectively-
focused moral theories; namely communitarians, feminist communitarians, and humanists.   
 
Communitarianism 
 
The three great political values from the French Revolution onward were liberty, equality and 
community (also known as fraternity)(Kymlicka, 2002, p. 208). However, in the period after World 
War II, the value of community became less prominent.11 It was in this context that Rawls wrote A 
Theory of Justice (1972), in which he specifically provides analysis on issues of liberty and equality, 
but fails to mention community (Kymlicka, 2002, p. 208). In A Theory of Justice, Rawls argues that we 
are able to achieve a picture of the just society by thinking of ourselves as adopting the moral 
perspective of the ‘original position’ – i.e. a moral perspective in which impartial individuals, who are 
free and equal, derive the principles of justice. In order to ensure the impartiality of those in the 
imagined original position, Rawls develops the conceptual tool of the ‘veil of ignorance.’ That is, we 
are to imagine a hypothetical situation in which those deciding the arrangement of society do so 
from a position in which they lack knowledge of themselves, their position in society, and even of 
the society itself (Rawls, 1972, p. 11). Communitarianism arose as a response to Rawls’s account of 
disconnected personhood as articulated in the veil of ignorance and thus crucially underpinning his 
account of justice, although it should be noted that most of the thinkers associated with this 
movement did not self-identify as communitarians (Mullhall & Swift, 1992). Two of the most 
prominent thinkers in communitarianism are Michael Sandel in Liberalism and the Limits of Justice 
(1982) and Alisdair MacIntyre in After Virtue (1981). The work of these two writers, specifically the 
aspects of their critique of Rawls that relate to communitarianism, will be discussed in comparison 
to Metz’s account of ubuntu.  
 
                                                          
11
 This becomes even more pronounced after the Cold War, however, this stands outside of the relevant 
chronology under discussion here.  
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 One of Sandel’s core concerns with Rawls is with the ‘theory of the person’ he elicits to devise the  
veil of ignorance. On this conception of the personhood, community is just one value among many 
that the individual may or may not choose to accept (Sandel, 1982 , p. 64). Instead Sandel argues 
that our understanding of ourselves as members of families and communities is constitutive of the 
self, and that we are incapable of conceiving of ourselves as separated from them (Sandel, 1982 , p. 
179 ). This resonates strongly with the understanding of ubuntu captured by the proverb ‘I am 
because we are’, because of the strong sense of interconnected personhood it promotes. Further, it 
also resonates with Metz’s requirement that individuals involved in an ubuntu moral community 
identify as members of that community. MacIntyre’s project in After Virtue is much larger than just 
the communitarian issues. His main concern is that in post-enlightenment philosophy, moral debates 
have become ‘interminable’ (MacIntyre, 1985, p. 6) – that is, when competing arguments are 
reduced to irreconcilable yet legitimate premises, there is nothing that can be appealed to in order 
to resolve the dispute and those advocating the competing positions are forced to appeal to 
emotional factors (MacIntyre, 1985, p. 8 ). His argument intersects with the communitarian debate 
when he looks at moral starting points. In contrast to Rawls’s individual, separated from her 
relationships and society by the veil of ignorance, MacIntyre’s individual is understood as a moral 
agent by virtue of her various social roles:  
I am someone’s son or daughter, someone else’s cousin or uncle; I am a citizen of 
this or that city, a member of this or that guild or profession; I belong to this clan, 
that tribe, this nation. Hence, what is good for me has to be good for one who 
inhabits these roles. As such, I inherit from the past of my family, my city, my 
tribe, my nation, a variety of debts, rightful expectations and obligations. These 
constitute the given of my life, my moral starting point (MacIntyre, 1985, p. 220). 
 
What is noteworthy about MacIntyre’s approach, for current purposes, is that he advocates an 
account of morality that is inherently relational,12which captures the relational quality of Metz’s 
ubuntu ethic. He does not require that relationships be those of good will and therefore does not 
argue for anything that approximates the love requirement of Metz’s argument. It is here that the 
theories become distinguishable.  
 
Both MacIntyre and Sandel capture the sense of interconnectedness proposed by all three of the 
approaches to ubuntu discussed above. Further, Sandel captures Metz’s requirement for a shared 
sense of identity and MacIntyre captures the idea that morality is inherently premised on relational 
                                                          
12
 In feminist communitarian accounts, such as that provided by Friedman, the set of relevant relationships are 
expanded to include friendship and other relationships that are typified by care. This will be dealt with more 
fully later in this chapter.  
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properties. What the communitarians do not capture is i) the idea that members of the community 
ought to ‘love’ one another and ii) that the morally right action occurs when one promotes harmony. 
In these ways, Metz’s theory of ubuntu remains distinguishable. However, it is necessary to turn to 
humanism, which may fulfill both of these requirements.  
  
Humanism 
 
Humanism is not a single, narrowly defined belief system and Fowler (1999) argues that it is 
necessarily vague because human experience – which is the fundamental basis of humanism – is 
diverse, thus making it resistant to specific descriptions (p. 8). This makes it difficult to distill a 
specific description of humanism for the purposes of comparison with ubuntu. However, in Lamont’s 
The Philosophy of Humanism (1965), the following necessary conditions are provided for 
determining whether or not something counts as a ‘humanist philosophy’: 
1.) Naturalistic metaphysics and no reference to supernaturalism;  
2.) Free will; 
3.) Ethics grounded in relationships; 
4.) Achievement of the good life through harmonising self interest and 
community interest;  
5.) Necessity of aesthetics for human flourishing;  
6.) Belief in reason and scientific method; and  
7.) Constant return to all basic assumptions, including that of humanism itself (Lamont, 
1965, pp. 13-15).  
 
Humanism is intended to be a complete philosophical framework, hence the list incorporates a wide 
range of issues, not all of which are relevant for comparison with ubuntu. The items on Lamont’s list 
that are relevant are criterion 3) ethics grounded in relationships and criterion 4) the achievement of 
the good life by harmonising self-interest and community interest. Additionally, it is worth noting 
that Metz’s account also complies with criterion 1) because it is entirely secular. The religious-based 
accounts of ubuntu and arguably the proverb-based accounts would not comply with this criterion, 
thus making these formulations of ubuntu potentially easier to distinguish from humanism, because 
they make reference to supernaturalism and are therefore strictly prohibited by humanism. Criteria 
3) and 4) need further examination in order to determine if Metz’s secular account of ubuntu is 
distinguishable from humanism, as it is described above.  
 
Criterion 3 describes humanist ethics as grounded in relationships (Lamont, 1965, pp. 13-15). This is 
the same as Metz’s account, which is also focused on providing a realtional moral theory (Metz, 
2007, p. 333).  Further, Lamont describes these as being relationships of ‘brotherhood’, ‘friendship’ 
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and ‘compassionate concern’ (Lamont, 1965, p. 16). These relationships therefore approximate 
Metz’s requirement of ‘good will’. Further still, Lamont’s familial and friendship-orientated language 
makes it clear that the relationships required for humanism are not just associations of good will, 
but also ones of love. They are relationships then that would resonate with the analogy of the 
extended family. Once again, this captures a crucial aspect of Metz’s account of ubuntu.  All of the 
relational aspects of Met’s account are therefore captured by humanism – it is a relational theory, 
based on good will, that is very much like familial love. At this stage it seems unlikely that humanism 
and Metz’s secular ubuntu could be distinguishable.  
 
Criterion 4 makes reference to ‘harmony’ (Lamont, 1965, p. 13). Yet again, this captures an 
important aspect of Metz’s theory, the end result of which is that we ought to aim to produce 
‘harmony’. Even the language used in these accounts is the same. However, when the wording of 
the fourth criterion is examined closely, the fundamental distinction between Metz’s account and 
humanism is uncovered.  
 
Criterion 4 states that the good life is achieved ‘through harmonising self interest and community 
interest’ [emphasis added](Lamont, 1965, p. 13).  The operative term used is ‘self interest’, because 
where many accounts of ubuntu and humanism diverge is on the status of the individual in relation 
to the community. One aspect that all accounts of ubuntu share is their focus on the importance of 
the community. The result is that most accounts allow for individuals’ interests to be overridden to 
some degree by the communal good, differing in the extent to which individual interests can be 
compromised. For instance, returning to Menkiti’s account of processural personhood, the 
ontological priority of community would allow for communal interest to override individual interests 
to a substantial degree (Menkiti, 1984, pp. 172-173). In another interpretation of the relationship 
between individual and community in ubuntu, Gyeke argues that although the community is 
essential for human flourishing and therefore indispensible (2002, p. 301), ‘it cannot be persuasively 
argued that personhood is fully defined by the communal structure or social relationships’(Gyeke, 
2002, p. 305). On Gyeke’s account there would be little scope for the community to trump individual 
interests, though the community remains important.  
 
By contrast to the accounts of ubuntu, which prioritise community, humanism is premised on a 
strong commitment to ‘individual potential, status, dignity and uniqueness’ [emphasis 
added](Fowler, 1999, p. 2). This is due to the humanism’s development during the Enlightenment 
period and the result of this commitment is that humanism is actually distinctly individualistic 
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(Fowler, 1999, p. 2). While humanists recognise that individuals cannot survive in atomised vacuums 
of self-interest, and that the community is necessary for individual flourishing, the individual always 
takes priority over the community in humanism and communal interests can never trump the 
interests of the individual (Fowler, 1999, p. 139 & 141). On the humanist account of ethics, the 
community is therefore valuable only to the extent that it enables the individual to realise her 
potential as a rational and autonomous agent – i.e. the community is only valuable in an 
instrumental way. This view is incompatible with Metz’s account of ubuntu and at this point one may 
become sceptical as to whether ubuntu could be classed as a type of humanism at all, especially 
given how many accounts of ubuntu are non-secular (Menkiti, 1984; Cornell, 2004 and 2009; 
Ramose, 1999;  Mokgoro, 1998; Battle, 1997; Shutte, 1993 and 2001; Tutu, 2000), and given the 
central position attributed to the individual on the humanist account.  
 
Metz addresses similar positions as those articulated by the humanists – i.e. positions in which 
community is intrinsically valuable – in Toward an African Moral Theory (2007) and in Ubuntu as a 
Moral Theory: Reply to Four Critics (2007a), where he responds to Van Niekerk’s In Defence of an 
Autocentric Account of Ubuntu (2007). 
 
The core of what Van Niekerk  describes as the ‘autocentric’ account of ubuntu is that in order for 
the individual to flourish and to live a truly human life, she must have certain types of relationships 
with others (i.e. relationships that are caring and harmonious). Subtly different to the humanist’s 
account, Van Niekerk proposes that the autocentric account it not strictly instrumental – one cannot 
pursue good relationships with others solely for one’s own sake. One pursues good relationships for 
their own sake and one flourishes as a result. Pursuing good relationships with one’s own interests in 
mind would defeat the object and not help one to attain the good life (Van Niekerk, 2007, p. 368 ).  
Metz argues that there are at least three reasons for rejecting a self-regarding account of ubuntu. 
Firstly, it can lead to counter-intuitive results. For example, according to Metz, it may allow one to 
sacrifice an innocent to harvest their organs in a medical crisis because there is nothing intrinsically 
valuable about others that needs to be protected, our relationships with others are only pursued to 
the extent that they further our individuated self-development and flourishing. Further, Metz argues 
that this may be the morally obligatory course of action if it somehow allows one to maximize 
relationships with others (Metz, 2007a, p. 384). Secondly, he argues that self-regarding accounts of 
ubuntu do not allow one to sacrifice oneself for the good of others, because others are only of value 
to the extent that they advance the development of the individual (Metz, 2007a, p. 384). It might be 
possible to argue, following Van Niekerk’s example, that the permissibility of sacrificing others and 
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the impermissibility of sacrificing oneself, stems from the mischaracterisation of the autocentric 
approach to ubuntu as a strictly instrumental ethical theory.13One still needs to pursue good 
relationships with others for their own sake, and harvesting others’ organs or refusing to sacrifice 
oneself for the sake of others, even under certain extreme circumstances, may compromise the 
quality of those relationships. These counterintuitive examples would therefore not arise. However, 
Metz’s third reason for rejecting autocentric accounts severely compromises the efficacy of this 
approach. Metz’s concern is that it is an incoherent moral theory. It requires one to pursue 
relationships and to believe that they are good for their own sake, yet in reality the goodness of 
those relations is based in their ability to enhance individual flourishing. One therefore needs to hold 
a false belief about morality – that relationships with others are intrinsically valuable – in order to 
pursue the truly moral course of action – to enhance personal flourishing. This incoherence leads 
Metz to reject autocentric or self-regarding accounts of ubuntu (Metz, 2007a).  It is important to 
note that the rejection of the autocentric account of ubuntu is specific to Metz’s theory and to keep 
in view that other competing accounts of ubuntu would be compatible with both humanism and the 
autocentric account. For instance, Gyeke’s description of ubuntu, with its emphasis on individual 
rights and personal development, would be consistent with humanism. However, Metz’s description 
is given priority here, due to its initial selection as the ethical theory most compatible with the 
requirements of political theory.  
 
To conclude this section, it is important to note that there is some similarity between humanism and 
ubuntu, particularly in terms of their shared emphasis on loving relationships and the promotion of 
harmony. However, the core distinction between these accounts arises from the fact that the 
individual occupies the prime position in humanism, and while this may be compatible with some 
accounts of ubuntu (Van Niekerk, 2007; Wiredu, 1998; Gyeke, 2002), it is ultimately incompatible 
with Metz’s ubuntu, which is maintained as providing a promising basis for a South African political 
philosophy. The next section will look at feminist communitarianism, particularly because the 
feminist ethic of care and ubuntu seem to be so similar.  
 
Feminist Communitarianism  
 
There is no monolithic feminist theory and no single feminist political philosophy. Similarly, there is 
no uniform feminist communitarianism (Jaggar, 1983, p. 5 ; Kymlicka, 2002, p. 377). While some 
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 Although this follows from Van Nierkerk’s account, this is not the response that he gives. See In Defence of 
an Autocentric Account of Ubuntu (2007) for Van Niekerk’s own response to Metz.  
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feminist philosophers argue that the individualistic sense of personhood promoted by liberalism, 
particularly by Rawls, is inaccurate(Friedman, 1989 , p. 275; Jaggar, 1983, pp. 28-29 ), some oppose 
the extreme communal understanding of personhood advocated by communitarians such as Sandel, 
who claim that the individual is ‘constituted’ by the community (Sandel, 1982 , p. 150). The latter is a 
very similar criticism to that offered by Gyeke against Menkiti, as discussed earlier in this chapter. 
Still others are concerned by communitarianisms uncritical acceptance of community values, arguing 
that values are not unequivocally good just because they happen to achieve community 
endorsement. Feminists who offer this critique often also recommend that communitarians 
participate in discussions on the power structures that produce certain hegemonic values in society 
(Koggel, 2000, p. 102).  
 
Keeping the diversity of feminist moral philosophy in mind, the one area that can be accurately 
described as a ‘feminist communitarian’ position is that of the ‘ethic of care’ (Koggel, 2000, p. 102). 
Even this is an area of controversy in feminist circles, with liberal feminists arguing that the legal 
protections offered by a political system premised on juridical equality can be used to protect the 
rights of women in their public and private lives and that the ‘ethic of care’ is merely used to 
romanticise women’s traditional role as the care-giver in the home (Held, 1999, p. 292).  The 
feminist ethic of care relates directly to ubuntu as discussed so far and due to its striking similarity 
with ubuntu, it will be analysed in this section.  
 
The ethic of care first enters the feminist literature in Carol Gilligan’s In a Different Voice (1982). 
Gilligan’s concern was that psychoanalytic theory tends to rely on data collected exclusively from 
male subjects and assumes the normalcy of male experience, thus casting female experience as 
deviant and beyond explanation (Gilligan, 1982, p. 14). She therefore undertook three studies, based 
on interviews with men and women of various ages and from various socio-economic backgrounds, 
in which she explored issues of self-perception and perceptions of morality.14  As a result of these 
studies, she concludes that the masculine experience of the world is typified by an ontology of 
separation, resulting in a moral system based on rights and rules, abstracted from context. On the 
other hand, she postulates that the typical feminine experience is one of connectedness and 
feminine moral standards are premised on an ethic of care. It should be noted that Gilligan does not 
take this to be an essentialist claim, rather as the empirical results of her studies – women and men 
that participated in her study happened to show these tendencies, but this does not mean that the 
results are true for all men and women. Further, she recognises that the results of her study are 
                                                          
14
 For further details of the studies, see Gilligan, 1982: 2-4.  
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linked to broader social structures and are unlikely to be the connected to any essential features of 
the study-participants themselves(Gilligan, 1982, p. 2). Her description of the ethic of care is 
summarised in the following statement:  
This ethic [the ethic of care], which reflects a cumulative knowledge of human 
relationships, evolves around a central insight, that self and other are 
interdependent... [T]he fact of interconnection informs the central, recurring 
recognition that just as the incidence of violence is in the end destructive to all, so 
the activity of care enhances both others and self(Gilligan, 1982, p. 74). 
 
Gilligan’s work has come under substantial criticism, mostly by feminists who are concerned about 
essentialising the moral experiences of men and women. However, regardless of the controversy 
surrounding Gilligan’s work, In a Different Voice has opened up multiple areas of study and provided 
the impetus for substantial work in feminist moral philosophy (Hekman, 1995 , p. 3). 
As with much thinking about ubuntu, Gilligan’s account and the feminist moral theories it has 
inspired, involves elements devoted to describing human nature (although frequently not quite 
ontological) and there are the normative implications that result from those descriptions. This is 
what Hekman terms ‘the connection between morality and subjectivity’ (Hekman, 1995 , p. 71). For 
instance, in Liberalism and Ethics of Care (1999), Virginia Held critiques the account of personhood 
offered by liberalism as follows:  
A glaring deficiency in the liberal image of the individual citizen is that it abstracts 
from the interconnected social reality, taking ideal circumstances of an adult, 
independent head of a household as paradigmatic and ignoring all the rest. It 
overlooks the social relations of an economy that makes its members (including 
heads of households) highly dependent (Held, 1999, p. 294).   
 
She goes on to describe those periods in all of our lives when we are invariably dependent on others 
– infancy, early childhood, old age, and times of illness and injury(Held, 1999, p. 294). She thus 
develops an account of our experience of personhood that includes a period of seeming 
independence, but in which we are actually interdependent for most of our lives. This is an account 
of personhood that is likely to cohere with many secular accounts of ubuntu, including Metz’s 
central insight that we are functionally interdependent for most of our lives.  A stronger account of 
feminist personhood is that offered by Noddings, where she argues that relationships are 
‘ontologically basic’, meaning that ‘we recognize human encounter and affective response as a basic 
fact of human existence’ (Noddings, 1984, p. 4). From descriptive accounts of personhood flow 
moral implications. Invariably, in this area of feminist literature, the result of our interconnectedness 
is that we ought to care for one another and foster loving relationships (Noddings, 1984, p. 5). This is 
all very close to our understanding of ubuntu and should lead us to believe the ubuntu and the 
feminist ethic of care are indeed closely related.  
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However, Marilyn Friedman’s insightful article Feminism and Modern Friendship: Dislocating the 
community (1989 ), which deals specifically with the relationship between communitarianism and 
feminist communitarian thought, provides one with the sense that a marriage between ubuntu and 
feminist communitarianism is unlikely to be a ‘happy union’. In order to arrive at the point where we 
can see how this may relate to ubuntu, we need to work through her critique of communitarianism 
first. 
 
She begins by noting that at first glance, communitarian and feminist communitarian thought ought 
to have a great deal in common – especially given communitarians’ focus on the individual’s identity 
as embedded in the community as well as on the moral requirements of care and nurturance 
(Friedman, 1989 , p. 276).  In the same vein, ubuntu and feminist communitarian thought would 
appear similar for corresponding reasons. However, she goes on to argue that feminist 
communitarianism and communitarianism are not quite such comfortable allies:  
However, communitarian philosophy as a whole is a perilous ally for feminist 
theory. Communitarians invoke a model of community which is focused 
particularly on families, neighborhoods, and nations. These sorts of communities 
have harbored social roles and structures which have been highly oppressive for 
women, as recent feminist critiques have shown. But communitarians seem 
oblivious to those criticisms and manifest a troubling complacency about the 
moral authority claimed or presupposed by these communities in regard to their 
members. By building on uncritical references to those sorts of communities, 
communitarian philosophy can lead in directions which feminists should not wish 
to follow (Friedman, 1989 , p. 277).  
 
Fanois Mangena picks up on the question of the compatibility of ubuntu and feminist ethics in her 
fascinating paper The Search for an African Feminist Ethic: A Zimbabwean Perspective (2009), 
arguing that ubuntu15 places a disproportionate burden on women in African society, because it 
requires them to care not just for their nuclear families, but for members of their extended families 
and many additional members of their communities(Mangena, 2009, p. 24). The following excerpt, 
taken from an interview as part of Mangena’s field work sums up this point well:  
[T]his thing called hunhu (the Shona equivalence for ubuntu) has brought more 
burdens than benefits especially to us housewives because when an 
irresponsible husband brings AIDS in the home you are required to care for him, 
even against your will. The elders will tell you that you will have to do that in the 
spirit of hunhu. (Quoted in Mangena, 2009, p. 19) 
 
                                                          
15
 Although Mangena seems to be using a much broader sense of ubuntu than used in this study, her 
observation is still fitting for its purposes.  
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Cornell also points out the potential tension between ubuntu and broader feminist ethical concerns 
when reviewing Mokgoro J’s use of ubuntu in the Constitutional Court – who in her capacity as both 
a feminist and as an advocate of ubuntu in the Court may encounter a tension between trying to 
realise both values concurrently. However, according to Cornell, this tension can be resolved by 
recognising that these values take on new meanings as they are lived and that this fluidity in 
meaning allows for the reimagination of the role of women within the context of traditional values 
(Cornell, 2004, p. 671). The idea here is that the Court can take on projects, such as tranforming 
sexist inherentence regulations in customary law, while promoting values like ubuntu. That is to say, 
it can transform aspects of certain traditional values while promoting others. It would not be 
possible to include here an investigation into to go the problems of determining which values are 
worth promoting and which are not. Instead, it seems that this interpretation of how ubuntu can be 
used without being problematic to women misses the central point made above – that ubuntu 
seems to make actions that can be harmful to woman (such as caring for an unfaithful partner who 
has HIV/AIDS or caring for members of the extended community) morally obligatory. One might 
want to respond that ubuntu makes these kind of actions morally obligatory for everyone, but 
considering that most of these care-related functions are still performed by women, they are 
impacted most directly by the application of ubuntu.  
 
Although the considerations above may be extremely disconcerting, there is still a prominant 
similarity between ubuntu and the feminist ethic of care. Sandra Harding identifies this similarity in 
The Curious Coincidence of Feminine and African Moralities (1987). The point that Harding makes is 
that we should be struck by the possibility that two such similar ethical theories could have 
developed  independently in  such different contexts – i.e. in Western feminist groupings and in 
African philosophical circles(Harding, 1987, p. 304). As Harding rightly points out, this is extremely 
odd. She argues that one potential explanation for this ‘curious coincidence’ is the joint experience 
of isolation from andocentric Western moral theory, which impacted upon both women and Africans 
(Harding, 1987, p. 305). She thus promotes a  contextually and historically-rooted account of moral 
theory, the importance of which  will be addressed later in this chapter.  
 
In concluding the discussion on the feminist moral theory, ubuntu and the feminist ethic of care are 
virtually indistinguishable. They both require that loving (and caring) relationships with others be 
promoted and that moral theory be premised on these relationships. It is therefore necessary to 
determine whether it makes sense to pursue ubuntu as a distinct ethic, considering that so many of 
its fundamental elements are caputred elsewhere.  
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Distinguishing ubuntu  
 
Through an examination of the Western theories of humanism; communitariansim and feminist 
communitarianism, all of the elements of Metz’s African moral theory can be captured without any 
reference to ‘African values’. Does this mean that ubuntu should be discarded for the purposes of 
the current project? Two related reasons will be provided for why it still makes sense to focus on 
ubuntu, despite it not being conceptually distinct. Firstly, ubuntu resonates with the lived experience 
of South Africans and secondly, to borrow language from Janz (2004, 2009), ubuntu makes sense 
when we think about African philosophy ‘platially’ – not simply ‘spatially’.16   
 
 Firstly, ubuntu remains the most appropriate ethical tool to humanise South African politics, 
because it is more closely linked to the lived experience of many South Africans.   
 
The reason it may seem initially concerning that ubuntu is not conceptually distinguishable from 
humanism and feminist communitarianism, is because philosophy is typically concerned with 
concepts, abstracted from place and from particular cultural practices. To become too concerned 
with context would mark an exit from the domain of philosophy and entry into another area of study 
– such as anthropology, sociology, psychology or political science (Janz, 2009, p. 6), not to mention 
to open the door to all sorts of nasty relativisms. This account of philosophy makes it seem as 
though the concepts it addresses are somehow free floating ideas, perhaps tied to a context in the 
world, but not deeply rooted in that context. However, when using philosophy in practical political 
and policy-orientated spheres, this disconnected understanding of philosophy becomes 
inappropriate. Edgar Pieterse, for example, argues that when developing policies for cities it is 
crucially important that we take into account the lived experiences of those who inhabit in the cities 
- i.e. ‘the phenomenology of the city’(Pieterse, 2008 ). The same advice seems relevant for political 
life in general. Further, as Harding notes, there is something intuitively peculiar about the thought 
that one’s ontological, epistemic and moral experiences could be completely disassociated from our 
lived experiences, or from our contexts (Harding, 1987, p. 304). Shutte also addresses this issue in 
Philosophy for Africa (1993), noting that ‘actual philosophy is always produced in a particular culture 
and language and develops particular sets of concepts to deal with particular intellectual problems 
that are felt to be important’ (p. 17). As Harding notes, this may be why feminist communitarian 
                                                          
16
 To be expanded upon shortly. 
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thought and ubuntu share similarities, because they both developed under related systems of 
oppression. Thinking of philosophy as deeply rooted in lived experience then provides a reason for 
continuing to talk about ubuntu, because it more closely resonates with the lived experience of 
South Africans and therefore provides a more appropriate basis for humanising South African politics 
than do other ethical alternatives.  
 
Bruce Janz (2004, 2009) provides a more sophisticated framework for thinking about these issues, by 
describing them in terms of ‘spatial’ and ‘platial’ thinking. To illustrate the distinction he uses the 
example of map-making. Many examples of early maps are platial – meaning concerned with human 
experience, particularly the experience of place – they therefore have very little water (because back 
then very little of human experience happened out at sea) and the location of places represents 
their importance rather than their geographical location. In the mappamundi, dating back to 1290, 
Jerusalem was depicted as the centre of the earth because of its cetral significance to people at the 
time (Janz, 2004, p. 106 ). Over time however, maps became more spatially orientated, 
characterised by grids and lines of longitude and latitude. Maps stopped being expressions of lived 
experience and became abstract representations of geography (Janz, 2004, p. 106). Much 
philosophy inhabits the world of spatial thinking, concerned as it is with universals abstracted from 
the particulars of human experience. African philosophy has also adopted a primarily spatial mode, 
trying to reclaim intellectual space in the same way that Africans have been able to reclaim 
geographical space from their colonisers. In Janz’s own words: ‘The mind, as well as the land, must 
be decolonized. Space must be reclaimed’(2004, p. 107). When spatial reasoning rules, the 
important philosophical question is: ‘is there an African philosophy?’ or in the current debate ‘is 
there a distinguishable African ethic?’ Janz suggests that when we shift from a spatial to a platial 
understanding, the appropriate question becomes: ‘What is it to do philosophy in this (African) 
place?’(Janz, 2004, p. 110). Or for our purposes ‘What is it do ethics in this (African) place?’ When 
the question is asked in that form ubuntu is unavoidably invoked in the answer, because it forms 
part of the lived ethical experience of this (South African) place. Further, humanism and feminist 
communitarianism fall away, because they are not representative of an Africana phenomenology in 
the same way that ubuntu is.  
 
Now that an ethical theory that is at least somewhat distinguishable has been articulated, it is 
important to provide a sense of how this relates to ubuntu as a political philosophy. 
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Ubuntu as a Political Philosophy 
 
As already noted, political philosophy is typically grounded in ethical theory, with Utilitarianism and 
Kantianism providing the traditional normative basis of most Western accounts of political theory 
(Metz, 2009, p. 335). Shifting ubuntu from the level of an ethic to a political theory therefore 
requires that the guiding principle of the individual ethic becomes the guiding principle at the 
political level. At the end of the first chapter, it was concluded that ‘An action is right just insofar as 
it produces harmony and reduces discord; an act is wrong to the extent that it fails to develop 
community’(Metz, 2007, p. 334). When this is transposed to the political level, it requires that 
government officials also pursue actions that promote harmony and reduce discord.   
 
The next chapter is devoted to assessing whether there is the possibility of an ubuntu-based political 
theory being practically realisable.  
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Chapter 3:  
Ubuntu and the Law 
Introduction  
 
The previous chapters have been devoted to defining ubuntu as an ethic and as a political value. This 
chapter has a more pragmatic focus. It seeks to assess ubuntu’s real-world applicability, specifically 
by looking at an area where it has already found some practical application in South Africa – in the 
law. Other attempts have been made to give ubuntu practical effect in South Africa, such as the 
corporate sector’s enthusiasm over ‘ubuntu capitalism’ and its incorporation into the government’s 
Moral Regeneration Movement in late 1990s(McDonald, 2010, pp. 142-143). However, these efforts 
have typically lacked any attempt at theory and have often boiled down to being ‘simply wishful and 
naïve’(McDonald, 2010, p. 140).  By contrast, while legal scholars have struggled with the theoretical 
complexity of ubuntu, a substantial body of academic literature on its incorporation into the law has 
been developed, providing a theoretical ‘node’ on which to attach the philosophical understanding 
of ubuntu that has been developed through the course of this thesis. 
 
This chapter will be divided into three parts. The first section will provide a genealogy of ubuntu in 
the law, tracing its incorporation into South African legal culture from its initial inclusion in the 
interim Constitution17 and through some key cases that have made use of ubuntu. The second 
section will provide a more thorough examination of whether ubuntu has been successfully applied 
in the law, by comparing two competing assessments of ubuntu’s legal inclusion – that of Van der 
Walt, who questions the usefulness of ubuntu in the law, and that of Cornell, who celebrates its use. 
By the end of the second section it should be clear that ubuntu has had limited legal application, but 
that all is not lost. The intention of the third section is to demonstrate that the way in which ubuntu 
has been used in the law provides useful lessons for understanding its potential applicability in other 
spheres – firstly, by providing an understanding of ubuntu in terms of ideal and non-ideal theory, 
and secondly, by combating the naivety often associated with ubuntu-orientated projects. 
 
Genealogy of Ubuntu in the Law  
 
This section will provide a brief genealogy of ubuntu’s incorporation in the law. This will begin by 
discussing ubuntu’s initial inclusion in the interim Constitution and tracing its development in South 
African jurisprudence via some prominent ubuntu-orientated judgments. This includes its initial 
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 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 200 of 1993.  
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inclusion in the case law (S v Makwanyane); its clarification as a legitimate jurisprudential value 
(AZAPO v  President of the Republic of South Africa18); its extension into the socio-economic sphere 
(Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupier19); and its eventual solidification in the case law (Afri-
Forum v Malema20).   
 
Ubuntu first appeared in the post-amble of the South African interim Constitution, which mandated 
the creation of the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act 34 of 1995 (known as the 
Reconciliation Act), thereby bringing the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) into existence. 
The section states:  
The adoption of the Constitution lays the secure foundation for the people of 
South Africa to transcend the divisions and strife of the past, which generated 
gross violations of human rights, the transgression of humanitarian principles in 
violent conflicts and a legacy of hatred, fear, guilt and revenge. These can now 
be addressed on the basis that there is a need for understanding but not for 
vengeance, a need for reparation but not for retaliation, a need for ubuntu but 
not for victimisation.  
 
At this point in South Africa’s jurisprudential history ubuntu’s legal status was unclear. Ubuntu was 
only included in the post-amble of the interim Constitution and it referred specifically to the 
establishment of the TRC. It was therefore ambiguous as to whether ubuntu would be legally 
applicable beyond issues of reconciliation, or if the writers of the Interim Constitution had intended 
it to form part of South Africa’s jurisprudence more broadly. It seems reasonable to assume that if 
the intention had been for ubuntu to become a jurisprudential value, it would have been explicitly 
included in the main body of the text. This is similar to the point raised by the Attorney General in 
the case of S v Makwanyane, where he argued that if the writers of the Constitution had intended 
for the death penalty to be illegal, then the interim Constitution would have stated that explicitly 
(paragraph 11). However, as the intricacies of the Makwanyane case confirm, constitutional 
interpretation is substantially more complex than literally applying the exact words of the text to the 
facts of the case (paragraph 13, 16, 18 and 19).  Keeping this in mind, further cause for confusion 
was provided by ubuntu’s exclusion from the final Constitution21 (Keep & Midgley, 2007, p. 33; 
Motha, 2009, p. 305). If the relegation of ubuntu to the post-amble had not sent a clear message 
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 1996 (8) BCLR 1015 (CC).  
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 2004 (12) BCLR 1268 (CC). 
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 2011 (6) SA 240. 
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 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996.  
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about ubuntu’s legal status, then surely the absence of ubuntu from the final Constitution should 
have been an obvious sign that ubuntu was never intended to be central to the law and its 
application in South Africa.  
 
In 1995, the question of whether ubuntu had legal implications beyond the TRC was at least partially 
resolved in the case of S v Makwanyane, where the Court had to decide whether the death penalty 
would remain a permissible sentence in the new constitutional order. The conclusion was that the 
death penalty was no longer appropriate, and amongst the reasons provided was that it violates the 
spirit of ubuntu. Ubuntu was explicitly included in the main judgment of Chaskalson P and in the 
concurring judgments of Madala J, Mokgoro J, Mahomed J, Langa J and Sachs J. However, ubuntu 
was only one reason among many provided by the Court, and it seems clear that the same decision 
would have been reached without any mention of ubuntu. Van der Walt questions whether ubuntu 
formed part of the main rationale for the decision at all, or whether ubuntu was simply obiter (an 
interesting aside with no actual bearing on the outcome of the case). He argues that the main 
rationale for the decision was that the death penalty is a disproportionate punishment, especially 
when one considers that there are alternative sentences available to the Court (Van der Walt, 2005, 
pp. 105-106). This interpretation is compelling, especially when one returns to Chaskalson P’s 
judgment, where he explicitly states that:  
Disparity between the crime and the penalty is not the only ingredient of 
proportionality; factors such as the enormity and irredeemable character of the 
death sentence in circumstances where neither error nor arbitrariness can be 
excluded, the expense and difficulty of addressing the disparities which exist in 
practice between accused persons facing similar charges, and which are due to 
factors such as race, poverty, and ignorance, and the other subjective factors 
which have been mentioned, are also factors that can and should be taken into 
account in dealing with this issue. It may possibly be that none alone would be 
sufficient under our Constitution to justify a finding that the death sentence is 
cruel, inhuman or degrading. But these factors are not to be evaluated in 
isolation. They must be taken together, and in order to decide whether the 
threshold set by section 11(2) has been crossed they must be evaluated with 
other relevant factors, including the two fundamental rights on which the 
accused rely, the right to dignity and the right to life... The carrying out of the 
death sentence destroys life, which is protected without reservation under 
section 9 of our Constitution, it annihilates human dignity which is protected 
under section 10, elements of arbitrariness are present in its enforcement and it 
is irremediable. Taking these factors into account... I am satisfied that in the 
context of our Constitution the death penalty is indeed a cruel, inhuman and 
degrading punishment (paragraph 94-95). 
 
33 
 
By contrast, when Chaskalson discusses ubuntu, he uses it only as a counterweight to retribution in 
the law, meaning that it is incorporated only as a subsidiary element of the proportionality test. This 
is clear in the following exert from the judgment:  
Retribution ought not to be given undue weight in the balancing process. The 
Constitution is premised on the assumption that ours will be a constitutional 
state founded on the recognition of human rights. The concluding provision on 
National Unity and Reconciliation contains the following commitment: ‘The 
adoption of this Constitution lays the secure foundation for the people of South 
Africa to transcend the divisions and strife of the past, which generated gross 
violations of human rights, the transgression of humanitarian principles in 
violent conflicts and a legacy of hatred, fear, guilt and revenge. These can now 
be addressed on the basis that there is a need for understanding but not for 
vengeance, a need for reparation but not for retaliation, a need for ubuntu but 
not for victimization’. Although this commitment has its primary application in 
the field of political reconciliation, it is not without relevance to the enquiry we 
are called upon to undertake in the present case. To be consistent with the 
value of ubuntu ours should be a society that ‘wishes to prevent crime... [not] to 
kill criminals simply to get even with them’ (paragraph 130 -131).  
  
This quote illustrates ubuntu’s role as one of many factors to be taken into account when 
determining proportionality. This is worrying if one is of the view that ubuntu should play a pivotal 
role in the Constitutional Court’s jurisprudence, because then it would be expected that ubuntu 
should be dealt with more substantially in the judgments. However, the comparative absence of 
ubuntu may not be surprising, given that ubuntu is, at best, a value to be used in the process of legal 
interpretation, and not a legal rule to be transmitted via precedent.22 Keeping that in mind, it 
remains worrying that ubuntu is dealt with in such a limited way, given the extent of the role that 
legal philosophers and the philosophical community more broadly attribute to it.  
 
Importantly for the purposes of this genealogy, the quote from Chaskalson explicitly indicates that 
although the post-amble ‘has its primary application in the field of political reconciliation’ it is not 
strictly bound to the TRC and may be relevant to further legal problems. Although Chaskalson 
mentions briefly in the above extract that the post-amble may have applicability beyond the TRC, for 
those concerned about ubuntu’s relegation to the post-amble (a section with supposedly less legal 
status than the main body of the interim Constitution) this provides little comfort. The question of 
the post-amble’s status is explicitly clarified in the 1996 case of AZAPO v President of the Republic of 
South Africa. 
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 This maps onto Kennedy’s distinction between ‘rules’ and ‘standards’, where rules are legal prescriptions 
and standards are the values used to narrow very broad generalised rules to specific fact and to prioritise 
particular rules instances where they may clash (Kennedy, 1976, pp. 1690- 1693).  
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In the AZAPO case, families of apartheid victims called into question the validity of Section 20(7) of 
the Reconciliation Act, which allowed for amnesty to be granted to those who committed political 
crimes during apartheid. The applicants argued that the amnesty provision violated their 
constitutional right to a trial, as protected by Section 22 of the interim Constitution, stating that: 
‘[e]very person shall have the right to have justiciable disputes settled by a court of law or, where 
appropriate, another independent or impartial forum.’ The Court decided against the applicants for 
two reasons: 1) the amnesty provision was necessary to gain information on crimes that were 
committed during apartheid and which normal criminal investigations would be unable to uncover 
(paragraph 36); and 2) the post-amble, which empowers the Reconciliation Act, is a legitimate part 
of the interim Constitution and it is therefore capable of limiting the right to a trial as envisaged in 
Section 22 (paragraph 12). This unequivocally resolves the question of the post-amble’s status in 
relation to the rest of the interim Constitution, with Mohamed J explicitly stating that ‘[t]he 
epilogue...has no lesser status than any other part of the Constitution’ (paragraph 14). It thereby 
provides some guidance about ubuntu’s legal status, because it clarifies that ubuntu formed part of 
a legitimate section of the interim Constitution and was therefore available to the Court as a 
constitutional value. However, once again, this is an unsatisfying conclusion in that ubuntu failed to 
play a substantial role in the decision-making process of this case. It failed to form part of the two 
main reasons provided for the decision – constitutional consistency and evidentiary necessity –and 
the term ‘ubuntu’ was only mentioned three times in the entire judgment (each time as part of an 
overall reference to the post-amble’s establishment of the TRC, never as a value in its own right). 
This provides cause for concern, because in both of the two cases discussed so far, ubuntu is used in 
a very limited manner.  
 
The case of Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers provides some hope that ubuntu may 
perform substantive work in the law, because it seems to successfully extend ubuntu into the socio-
economic  sphere and show that ubuntu can form a meaningful part of the Court’s reasoning 
process. The case involved two issues: whether the municipality can evict unlawful occupiers and 
whether there is an obligation on the party seeking an eviction order to find suitable alternative 
accommodation for the occupiers. This case may ease concerns that ubuntu fails to form a real part 
of the Court’s reasoning process, because Sachs’s judgment seems to be fundamentally premised on 
ubuntu (Keep & Midgley, 2007, p. 17). Sachs states explicitly: 
It [the Prevention of Illegal Eviction Act - PIE] is called upon to balance 
competing interests in a principled way and promote the constitutional vision of 
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a caring society based on good neighbourliness and shared concern. The 
Constitution and PIE confirm that we are not islands unto ourselves. The spirit of 
ubuntu, part of the deep cultural heritage of the majority of the population, 
suffuses the whole constitutional order. It combines individual rights with a 
communitarian philosophy (paragraph 37). 
 
In a later interview with the Ubuntu Project about the case, Sachs stated that he would have been 
unable to reach his decision without recourse to ubuntu (Cornell, 2009). However, ubuntu’s role in 
the case remains questionable, given that the above quote is the only time when ubuntu is 
mentioned in the judgment. Once again, given that ubuntu is just an interpretive value and that the 
case fundamentally turned on PIE and the rights to property and housing, this may be understable to 
a certain extent. However, there is still something deeply disconcerting about the almost complete 
absence of ubuntu from the text of the judgment.  
  
A more recent case provides some optimism about ubuntu’s applicability to the legal decision 
making process. In the 2011 case of Afri-Forum v Malema, the Equality Court had to decide whether 
the ANC Youth League leader at the time, Julius Malema, was guilty of hate speech by publically 
singing the words ‘Shoot the boer [farmer]’,where the term ‘boer’ is taken to refer to Afrikaans 
farmers in particular and white South Africans more generally (paragraph 49). In contrast to the 
previous cases discussed, ubuntu does seem to do substantial work in reaching the decision. There is 
an entire section of the judgment devoted to clarifying ubuntu, where Lamont J states that ‘[a]n 
ubuntu-based jurisprudence has been developed particularly by the Constitutional Court. Ubuntu is 
recognised as being an important source of law…’ (paragraph 18) and in the decision itself (that 
publically singing the song does constitute hate speech) the Judge specifically states that complying 
with the order is a matter of ‘both law and ubuntu’ (paragraph 111). Further, Lamont J’s trial process 
echoes ubuntu. Evidence of this is provided by the following exerts from the judgment:  
During the hearing I allowed much evidence to be led which would not normally 
be permitted in a Court of law as it appeared to me that it was proper to allow 
the parties to the dispute to fully and completely ventilate the issues between 
them even… (paragraph 58) 
 
It appeared to me that in the course of the trial the parties should, as it were, be 
allowed to scratch the wound open, re-experience the pain and search for a 
solution. (paragraph 58) 
 
The public was entitled to see the events transpiring in Court so as not only be 
able to form its own judgment but also to re-live events as part of a process of 
healing. I directed that any party including a witness could at any time request 
the process to be stopped; that it was then to stop immediately pending further 
orders…(paragraph 47) 
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This all seems to indicate that ubuntu played a fundamental role in the decision of the Malema case, 
not only in Lamont J’s reasoning, but also in the procedure adopted during the hearing. Thus it 
would appear that this provides at least one case in which ubuntu has formed a substantial role and 
where it was explicitly recognised as doing so.  
 
How successfully has ubuntu been incorporated into the law?  
 
The previous section concluded that there has been a relative absence of ubuntu in those cases that 
purport to have incorporated it as a value in their decision making. The one exception is the Malema 
case, where ubuntu played a meaningful and explicit role in the judgment. This raises the broader 
question of how successfully ubuntu has been included in the law. This section will therefore assess 
more carefully ubuntu’s usefulness in the law, specifically by looking at Van der Walt and Cornell’s 
assessments of ubuntu’s impact on South Africa’s jurisprudence.  
 
Van der Walt  
 
Van der Walt identifies at least three problems with ubuntu’s inclusion in the law: a lack of 
conceptual clarity; a lack of African particularity; and a lack of appropriate cultural context when 
making use of ubuntu in the law. Each of these will be discussed in turn.  
 
Van der Walt is concerned that ubuntu is employed in the law without any 
specificity about the term’s meaning (Van der Walt, 2005, p. 111). In discussing 
Justice Langa’s judgment in S v Makwanyane, which he initially takes to be one 
of the more promising legal accounts of ubuntu, Van der Walt concludes that: 
Justice Langa’s opinion, however, still leaves one with a nagging feeling that he 
offers us no more insight than do his colleagues regarding the specific and 
singular meaning of ubuntu (Van der Walt, 2005, pp. 110-111).  
 
Van der Walt argues that instead of a clear definition, the Court has provided a series of non-specific 
feel-good phrases that ‘would have had John Lennon (Imagine All the People) scrambling for new 
verses’ (Van der Walt, 2005, p. 110). Van der Walt’s assumption is that concepts need clear 
definitions before they can be allowed to do legal work, which is an intuitively appealing position to 
hold. However, it is contrary to the history of legal practice, where concepts are frequently used 
before the Court has settled on definitive meanings for them. The most famous example of this is 
provided by Justice Potter Stewart in the American case of Jacobellis v Ohio, who while trying to 
settle on a clear definition for pornography concluded that ‘I will know it when I see it’. The point is 
37 
 
that legal praxis can (and often does) precede full theoretical understanding of the concepts 
employed – a comprehensive definition of pornography is not required in order to place a restriction 
on it in the law. Similarly, dignity is frequently employed by the Courts, despite remaining 
conceptually unclear to those who invoke it (McCrudden, 2008).  This issue will be revisited in more 
detail later in this chapter when addressing the distinction between ideal and non-ideal theory.  No 
more will added at this stage, except to point out that Van der Walt’s assumption that a lack of 
conceptual specificity is a problem for the Court is not as obvious as one might initially expect.  
 
The second problem Van der Walt identifies with ubuntu’s inclusion in the law is that it fails to add 
anything specifically African to jurisprudence. Van der Walt states the problem in this way:  
[A] rigorous jurisprudence must be dissatisfied with the feel-good flavour of a 
jurisprudence that has done little more than add a local, indigenous and 
communitarian touch to the Christian, Kantian or Millsian respect for the individual 
that informs Western jurisprudence(Van der Walt, 2005, p. 111). 
 
Van der Walt’s objection seems to be that if there is nothing distinctively African that ubuntu can 
add to South African jurisprudence, why bother? This is the same problem that was encountered 
earlier in thesis, when distinguishing ubuntu as an ethic from competing communally-orientated 
ethical theories from the West. The same response that was offered there applies here: what is 
important is not that ubuntu is conceptually distinct, but rather the lived experience of members of  
society needs to be taken into account when deciding what concepts will be used in the policies 
applicable to that society. Taking lived experience into account is particularly important for the law, 
which requires that the majority of society buys into its central values if they are going to comply 
with it. Therefore, all that needs to be shown in order for ubuntu to be applicable as a legal value is 
that it resonates with society, not that it is conceptually unique.  
 
Van der Walt’s third objection is that ubuntu is thoughtlessly removed from its context in South 
African indigenous law when it is applied by the Court – i.e. it is used as though it is a concept with 
no pre-existing legal context. He is particularly dissatisfied that the Constitutional Court in S v 
Makwanyane fails to consider whether traditional communities in South Africa believe that the 
death penalty is an appropriate punishment for certain crimes (Van der Walt, 2005, pp. 111-112). 23 
Van der Walt’s thinking here can be interpreted in at least two ways. Firstly, if ubuntu is part of 
                                                          
23
 He notes that Sachs J does make some effort to determine what traditional communities believe about the 
death penalty. But he argues that Sachs provides an incomplete account, as he only recognises that the death 
penalty would be inappropriate in cases of murder but fails to recognise that the death penalty would be 
appropriate in cases of stock theft (Van der Walt, 2005, pp. 112-113).  
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traditional thought, then we can determine whether or not ubuntu and the death penalty are 
compatible by looking at the beliefs of the community from which ubuntu was taken – if they believe 
in both ubuntu and the death penalty, then they must be conceptually compatible.  However, this 
cannot possibly be a correct reading because it assumes that people only ever hold conceptually 
compatible beliefs, which is clearly not the case. A second, and more plausible, reading is that 
ubuntu needs to be preserved as a culturally authentic value and that this is damaged by removing it 
from its context. However, it is not obvious why this would be the case.   
 
Having examined Van der Walt’s core concerns, it seems unlikely that his extremely pessimistic view 
of incorporating ubuntu into South Africa’s legal jurisprudence is correct.   
 
Cornell 
 
Cornell recognises the difficulties that have been faced by the Court in incorporating ubuntu into the 
law (Cornell, 2009, p. 47). However, she argues that including ubuntu in the law is necessary for the 
realisation of the Constitution’s goals (Cornell, 2004, p. 674). She provides two justifications for 
holding this view: firstly, that ubuntu offers an understanding of personhood that is distinct from 
that provided by Western jurisprudence; secondly, that an ubuntu-infused jurisprudence is better 
able to cope with the reality of contradiction present in the law.  
 
The first way that Cornell sees ubuntu as being important for the law is that it brings an 
understanding of personhood that is absent from Western jurisprudence (Cornell, 2004, p. 668; 
Cornell, 2009, p. 57). Cornell provides a description of ubuntu as interdependence, with all the 
metaphysical trappings. In particular she emphasises the importance of serti – ‘the life force by 
which a community of persons are connected to each other’ (Cornell, 2004, p. 674). It should be 
noted that it is problematic for Cornell to adopt such a metaphysically-laden account of ubuntu, 
especially given the general applicability that we expect from the law. However, bracketing the 
supernatural elements of this account for the present moment, why might interdependence be 
useful for the law?   
 
Cornell argues that it changes the foundational values on which the legal system is premised – the 
‘law of laws’ in her terminology (Cornell, 2004, p. 670). The basis of Western jurisprudence is the 
social contract, with the individual at its core (Cornell, 2004, p. 668).  In the case of the Hobbesian 
social contract, individuals only come together to cooperate because they fear each other and find 
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security in transferring their right to violence to the state, who in turn commits to protecting them. 
By this account, it is not only the premise that individuals are atomised that is at issue, but also that 
their relationships are inherently antagonistic. Cornell, following Mokgoro J, argues that ‘ubuntu 
provides us with a very different notion of the founding principle of law’ (Cornell, 2004, p. 669). Her 
vision of a jurisprudence premised on ubuntu, which she borrows from Mokgoro J, is expressed as 
follows:  
The original conception of the law perceived not as a tool for personal defense, 
but as an opportunity given to all to survive under the protection of the order of 
the communal entity; communalism which emphasises group solidarity and 
interests generally, and all the rules which sustain it, as opposed to individual 
interests, with its likely utility in building a sense of national unity among South 
Africans; the conciliatory character of the adjudication process which aims to 
restore peace and harmony between members rather than the adversarial 
approach which aims to restore peace and harmony between members ... 
(Mokgoro J cited in Cornell, 2004, p. 669) 
 
The second way in which ubuntu is meant to enrich South African jurisprudence is by allowing us to 
better cope with contradiction in the law -  to use Cornell’s turn of phrase:  the ‘both-and’. She 
describes this situation as arising when two opposing registers come into conflict that cannot (or 
perhaps should not) be brought into a coherent whole.  For instance, one may simultaneously hold 
beliefs in both ancestor worship and the Constitution (Cornell, 2004, p. 673). Her second example is 
the case of Soobramoney v Minister of Health, Kwa-Zulu Natal,24 in which Soobramoney’s application 
for state-funded dialysis was rejected, because he had too many additional complicating health 
problems to qualify for the transplant list and dialysis is prioritised for patients awaiting transplants.  
Cornell concludes that the decision in Soobramoney is both ‘just’ and ‘tragic’, and that it is only by 
including ubuntu in our jurisprudence that we can cope with this result. This is because ubuntu 
allows both for the sacrifice of the individual for the greater good and for our society to be 
diminished by the loss of one of its members (Cornell, 2004, p. 674). Further, Cornell believes that 
the ‘both-and’ scope of ubuntu jurisprudence allows us to better deal with the unsatisfactory status 
of socio-economic rights in South Africa, which are simultaneously constitutionally guaranteed and 
unrealizable due to economic constraints – another example of that which is both tragic and just 
(Cornell, 2004, p. 674).  
 
Both of Cornell’s arguments are normative, in that they describe how South African jurisprudence 
might be enhanced by including ubuntu in the Court’s reasoning. However, it remains unclear 
                                                          
24
 1998 1 SA 765 (CC).  
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whether ubuntu has already been successfully used in the law and whether it is possible to realise 
the goals that Cornell advocates.  
 
At this stage, it is clear that ubuntu’s inclusion in the law has had limited success. In three out of the 
four cases discussed, ubuntu failed to form a meaningful part of the Court’s reasoning process. 
Further, there are the challenges described by Van der Walt – a lack of specificity, uniqueness, or 
contextualisation – which although questioned in this chapter, are worth keeping in mind when 
assessing ubuntu’s inclusion in the law. Cornell has been more optimistic in her account of ubuntu in 
the law, describing it as capable of changing the fundamental premises of the legal system and 
allowing South Africans to better cope with instances of contradiction in the law – that which is both 
just and tragic; that which is morally imperative and practically unachievable. However, these are 
forward-looking suggestions about what ubuntu might achieve in the law, which does not help us to 
understand the limited success of ubuntu’s inclusion in the law to date.  
 
Lessons from ubuntu in the law 
 
The previous section concluded that ubuntu has had limited success in its incorporation in the law. 
However, this does not mean that discussing ubuntu in this context is not worthwhile for improving 
our understanding of ubuntu’s applicability. In this section it will be argued that the way the Courts 
have grappled with ubuntu provides two important lessons for our understanding.  
 
Praxis preceding theory 
 
One of the core challenges facing those who make use of ubuntu is that it is so tricky to define. As 
Van der Walt correctly identifies, this problem has also been experienced by the Courts (Van der 
Walt, 2005, pp. 110-111). Despite this difficulty, the Courts have made some use of ubuntu, albeit in 
a limited manner. This provides at least some reason to believe that ubuntu can have practical 
application prior to the achievement of a full theoretical understanding of it has been achieved.   
 
The question of whether a correct theoretical understanding of ubuntu should precede its 
application links to the broader philosophical debate on the connection between ideal and non-ideal 
theories of justice, a distinction first identified by Rawls in A Theory of Justice (1972)(Simmons, 2010, 
p. 5).  Rawls defines an ideal theory of justice as one that assumes that members of society will 
strictly comply with the requirements of justice, thus allowing the philosopher to work out the 
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institutional framework of a well-ordered society under ideal conditions. Non-ideal theory comes 
into play in order to practically realise the vision of ideal theory, particularly in determining what 
transitional steps need to be taken in order for society to be brought closer to the ideal (Rawls, 
1972, pp. 245-246). In Rawls’s description, ideal theory takes strict priority over non-ideal theory and 
must be fully worked out before any attention can be paid to the pragmatic concern of its 
applicability to society. Rawls’s distinction is not applicable as is to the current discussion, because 
the concern here is not with developing a ‘theory of justice’ as such. However, the distinction 
between an abstract idealised political philosophy and its practical realisation in politics is useful to 
keep in mind as we grapple with the difficulties of trying to define ubuntu and find its application in 
the real world.  
 
If Rawls is correct about the strict priority of ideal theory over non-ideal theory, then it would be 
extremely difficult to understand ubuntu’s inclusion in the Constitutional Court’s jurisprudence, 
given the problems associated with providing definitional content for ubuntu. However, ubuntu does 
seem to find some application in the Court, thus making it seem that the practical work of the 
concept may be able to precede our complete theoretical understanding of it.  
 
Sen offers a helpful response to Rawls in The Idea of Justice (2009), in which he argues against 
Rawls’s strict priority of the ideal over the non-ideal, and suggests that an ideal theory of justice may 
not be necessary at all for dealing with real issues of social justice. Sen sees real world decisions 
about justice as comparative – do we choose social arrangement A or social arrangement B? In 
making comparative assessments it is not necessary to imagine an additional perfect alternative. For 
example, in determining whether a painting by Picasso or Van Gogh is superior, it is not necessary to 
have an idea of the perfect painting in order to make a decision (Sen, 2009, pp. 101-102). Similarly, 
when policy makers choose between competing policies, they are unlikely to turn to Rawls or any 
ideal theory of justice in selecting their programme of action. The conclusion seems to be that we 
can dispense with ideal theories of justice entirely, and get on with the practical work of pursuing 
social justice in the real world. However, social policy development differs from aesthetic 
judgements, in that considerations of justice do seem to play a role in selecting between alternative 
social arrangements, even though they may not amount to the kind of fully worked out theory of 
justice that Rawls would require.  
 
 This suggests that there might be a middle path to tread between Rawls’s strict priority of ideal 
theory and Sen’s suggestion that we might dispense with theory entirely. This is helpful for 
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understanding the example of the Court’s use of ubuntu, in that some use of the concept has 
occurred prior to obtaining a full theoretical grip on it. This is not the only instance of Courts using a 
concept before it is fully understood. Courts across the world frequently make use of the concept of 
dignity without necessarily having settled on a complete theoretical understanding of the term 
(McCrudden, 2008). Naturally, the use of ‘dignity’ in the law is at a distinct advantage over the use of 
‘ubuntu’, given that attempts to theoretically understand dignity in the context of the law date back 
to the Roman Law tradition (McCrudden, 2008, p. 657). Of course, having such a broad history of 
thought associated with ‘dignity’ means that it has come to have a far more substantial role to play 
in the law than ubuntu. The hope, however, is that as our theoretical understanding of ubuntu 
improves, so Courts may feel more free to make use of it in their reasoning.  
 
Combating the naivety of ‘ubuntu-ists’   
 
In the popular imagination, ubuntu is unequivocally positive. Desmond Tutu provides a well-
accepted account of a person ‘with ubuntu’ as one who is generous, hospitable, friendly, caring, 
compassionate, sharing, unjealous, etc. (Tutu, 2000, p. 31). These are all positive attributes. When 
this personal picture of ubuntu is expanded to the political level it becomes utopian. For instance, in 
the Department of International Relations and Cooperation White Paper, Building a Better World: 
The Diplomacy of Ubuntu(2011), South African foreign policy informed by ubuntu is described as:  
This philosophy translates into an approach to international relations that 
respects all nations, peoples, and cultures. It recognises that it is in our national 
interest to promote and support the positive development of others. Similarly, 
national security would therefore depend on the centrality of human security as a 
universal goal, based on the principle of Batho Pele (putting people first). In the 
modern world of globalisation, a constant element is and has to be our common 
humanity. We therefore champion collaboration, cooperation and building 
partnerships over conflict. This recognition of our interconnectedness and 
interdependency, and the infusion of Ubuntu into the South African identity, 
shapes our foreign policy (Department of International Relations & Cooperation , 
2011, p. 4). 
 
This statement clearly indicates the overwhelmingly positive attitude that is expressed toward 
ubuntu and its practical application. However, it ignores that incorporating ubuntu into the political 
realm may involve negative consequences. Ignoring these potential consequences is a dangerous 
oversight, and may indicate a shift away from the utopian ubuntu ideal toward dystopia. What are 
these potential negatives and how does the legal application of ubuntu forewarn us of them?   
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The negative potential of ubuntu is that it may be possible for the individual to be sacrificed for the 
collective good (Mokgoro, 1997). The first indication of this possibility in the law is provided in the 
case of S v Magadani.25 In this case, the Court took ubuntu into account at the time of sentencing, 
and found the crime to be such an infringement of ubuntu that he was given a life sentence (Keep & 
Midgley, 2007). This case at least indicates that the interests of the individual (to have a shorter 
sentence) may in some cases be sacrificed for the good of the group (to have particularly dangerous 
criminals in jail for longer).  
 
A second case where we can see the potential of ubuntu to sacrifice the interests of the individual is 
in Soobramoney v Minister of Health, as discussed above. Interestingly, ubuntu was not explicitly 
mentioned in this case and instead, the reasoning is explicitly utilitarian – placing the emphasis on 
Department of Health budget restrictions and the moral obligation to maximise the good provided 
by the health system. However, this case is included in Cornell’s discussion of Sach’s ubuntu 
jurisprudence (Cornell, 2004, p. 672) and Sach’s concurring judgment in the case makes use of 
language very close to that used in discussions related to ubuntu. For instance, Sachs explicitly states 
that: 
Health care rights by their very nature have to be considered not only in a 
traditional legal context structured around the ideas of human autonomy but in 
a new analytical framework based on the notion of human interdependence. A 
healthy life depends upon social interdependence... (paragraph 54). 
 
Sachs clearly evokes the language that is typically associated with ubuntu, thereby indirectly 
introducing it without explicitly naming it. Therefore, the Soobramoney case, despite not being 
directly premised on ubuntu, provides a sense of the danger potentially associated with practically 
employing ubuntu.  
 
Ubuntu is not the first ethical theory to face the criticism that individuals may be sacrificed for the 
collective good. Utilitarianism in particular has been criticized for failing to take account of the 
separateness of persons – i.e. the objection that one cannot make utilitarian calculations across 
persons as though they were assessments within a single life (Nozick, 1974). This objection may be 
less problematic to those who already accept ubuntu, because they may be less committed to the 
separation of personal identity. However, Wolff attributes utilitarianism’s waning popularity to this 
objection and advocates of ubuntu should therefore at least be aware of this concern (Wolff, 2006).  
                                                          
25
 2001 JDR 0321 (V).  
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The legal application of ubuntu illustrates that those invoking ubuntu need to at least be sensitive to 
the possibility of sacrificing the individual for the benefit of the group. This may not discredit 
endeavours to make use of ubuntu practically, but those involved in these practices should be aware 
of the possibility of sacrifice implicit in their activities.26 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has argued that the application of ubuntu in the law provides a better understanding of 
how ubuntu might be practically applied. This has been done by firstly tracing ubuntu’s 
incorporation into the law and by assessing how successful the transition into the law has been – 
specifically by looking at Van der Walt and Cornell. It was concluded that ubuntu has played a 
relatively limited role in the law and that it is often mentioned in cases without actually being 
involved in the reasoning process of the Courts. However, the final section of the chapter considered 
some lessons we can take from the use of ubuntu in the law for broader application– specifically by 
understanding it in terms of the ideal and non-ideal theory and it helping us to overcome some of 
the overly-optimistic naivety associated with ubuntu.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
26
 Van der Walt argues that all instances of the law involve sacrifice, but he is also of the position that 
recognising these sacrifices is better for the overall functioning of society.  
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Conclusion 
 
This dissertation was motivated by a concern that there is something deeply unethical about the 
current political system in South Africa, due its (re)production of such high levels of inequality. The 
sense was that a political theory based on ubuntu, which requires that we foster loving relationships 
and that at the very least we treat each other humanely, could go some way to undoing the 
conceptual underpinnings of a political-community that seems to have such little regard for the well-
being of its members. To borrow Albie Sach’s language in the PE Municipalities case, the hope was 
that ubuntu could ‘humanise’ our politics. In order to achieve this aim, this thesis set out to explore 
the possibility of an ubuntu-based political philosophy, following the core assumption that political 
theory is grounded in ethics.  
 
The first task was therefore to articulate ubuntu as an ethic. In order to do this, three competing 
strategies for developing ubuntu as an ethical theory were assessed: an ubuntu ethic by religion, an 
ubuntu ethic by maxim, and an ubuntu ethic by underlying principle. Metz’s ubuntu ethic by 
underlying principle was favoured, because it allowed for the possibility of a secular account of 
ubuntu, which is necessary for developing a political theory relevant to an imagined community of 
diverse people and cultures.  
 
However, Metz’s articulation of the core ubuntu ethic as: ‘An action is right insofar as it produces 
harmony and reduces discord; an act is wrong to the extent that it fails to develop community’ 
(2007, p. 334), shows some initial similarities to the moral requirements of communitarianism, 
feminist communitarianism and humanism. It therefore became necessary to examine whether 
there is anything distinctive about ubuntu that makes it a more suitable candidate for application in 
a South African context. In this examination it was found that ubuntu is remarkably similar to the 
feminist ethic of care and that all of the most fundamental conceptual aspects of ubuntu can be 
captured without any reference to African ethics. However, it was concluded that ubuntu remains 
the most appropriate candidate for a locally-orientated political philosophy because it resonates 
with South Africans’ lived experience in ways that Western communally orientated ethical theories 
do not. The normative requirement of this ubuntu ethic, when expanded to the political level, would 
therefore be that government actions and policies ought to function to ‘produce harmony’, ‘reduce 
discord’ and ‘develop community’.  
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The final task of this project was therefore to determine whether ubuntu could ever have practical 
effect in the political realm. This was done by looking at South African jurisprudence, due to the 
practical role that ubuntu has already played in the law. In establishing a genealogy of ubuntu’s 
incorporation into the law, it was found that ubuntu has been incorporated into the law with limited 
success and that in many of the cases in which it is named it fails to do substantial work in the 
jurisprudential reasoning. However, the Court’s use of ubuntu teaches us important lessons for 
invoking ubuntu in the political realm – that we can make use of ubuntu practically before achieving 
a complete theoretical understanding on the concept and that we need to be wary of the possibility 
of the sacrifice of individuals in the application of ubuntu.  
 
In order to fully realise the ambition of an ubuntu-based political philosophy, subsequent work 
would need to focus on practical political examples, keeping in mind the lessons from the law, to 
develop a sense of what an ubuntu politics would realistically require. To use Rawls’s language, the 
task now is to develop non-ideal theory to bring society closer to the ideal offered by an ubuntu-
based political philosophy.  
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